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PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND DISCRIMINATION
IN THE DECISION TO CHARGE
Amy Grossman Applegate*
I. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: THE PROBLEM
It is universally recognized that prosecutors exercise tremendous
amounts of discretion in deciding whether or not to initiate proceed-
ings against a person for the commission of a crime.' The courts have
traditionally been extremely solicitous toward this prosecutorial dis-
cretion.' The case law is replete with instances of judicial affirmation
* J.D., cum laude, Harvard Law School, 1981; Staff Attorney in the Enforce-
ment Division of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The author wishes to
express deep gratitude for the guidance and assistance of Dean James Vorenberg of
the Harvard Law School.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims
responsibility for any private publication or statement of any of its employees. The
views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues on the Staff of the Com-
mission.
1. "Discretion" is a term often used but difficult to define. A comprehensible
definition may be found in Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice
Officials, 1976 DuKE L.J. 651:
For our purposes discretion can best be seen as a residual concept-the room
left for subjective judgment by the statutes, administrative rules, judicial
decisions, social patterns and institutional pressures which bear on an offi-
cial's decision. Our system gives no official unlimited discretion and every
decision or action involves some exercise of judgment. A precise definition
is not crucial since discretion is a relative concept-more or less free rein
for decisions by public officials. As long as this is understood, Judge
Breitel's simple definition may suffice: "[Plower to consider all circum-
stances and then determine what legal action is to be taken."
Id. at 653-54 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law
Enforcement, 27 U. Cm. L. REv. 427 (1960)).
2. The number of cases in which courts have upheld prosecutors' exercises of
discretion are too numerous to completely document. Examples include: United
States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 784-88 (1977) (18 month delay by federal prosecu-
tors in bringing charges against respondent not a due process violation and lower
courts therefore had erred in dismissing indictment) ; United States v. Thompson, 251
U.S. 407, 411-13 (1920) (Court may not exercise its discretion to limit district attor-
ney's decision to make resubmission to grand jury). Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 454, 457 (1868) (Attorney General has discretion to dismiss an appeal brought
by government) ; United States v. Wallace, 578 F.2d 735, 740 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 898 (1978) (Petite policy, under which Justice Department declines to bring
a federal prosecution after a state proceeding unless compelling reasons exist, involves
an exercise of prosecutorial discretion not subject to judicial evaluation) ; United States
v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771, 782 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976) (prose-
cutor's exercise of discretion in prosecuting appellant's filing of false Medicare state-
ments while not prosecuting others' Medicare form mistakes upheld) ; United States v.
Raven, 500 F.2d 728, 733 (5th Cir. 1974) (defendant's evidence failed to establish bad
faith enforcement despite his contention that he was first subject of criminal prosecution
under statutes in question and despite alleged existence of other violators of statutes) ;
United States v. Strutton, 494 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1974) (court declined to
reverse prosecutor's exercise of discretion in the face of defendant's allegation that
his prosecution was a callous indictment of a pathetic and harmless individual);
United States v. Ream, 491 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir. 1974) (defendant's failure to
present facts which would raise doubt about prosecutor's motive precluded court
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of prosecutorial discretion in the decision to charge,3 not to charge,4
and what to charge." A prosecutor may not be compelled to bring a
prosecution,6 nor, for the most part, compelled to terminate one.7
from granting motion for discovery and motion to dismiss on ground that defendant
was being discriminatorily prosecuted because of his antiwar activities) ; United
States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 220-21 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972)
(Attorney General has discretion to limit prosecution to one of several newspapers
allegedly in violation of Civil Rights Act) ; Spillman v. United States, 413 F.2d 527,
530 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 930 (1969) (court refused to inquire into
motives of United States Attorney for prosecuting appellant, despite fact that prose-
cution violated policy of Department of Justice) ; Washington v. United States, 401
F2d 915, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (evidence that enforcement of law is lax or that
other offenders may go free held insufficient to show abuse of prosecutorial discre-
tion in particular prosecution under the law) ; Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d
479, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (United States Attorney's consent to guilty plea
tendered by codefendant for lesser included offense under indictment and refusal to
grant same plea for defendant did not constitute denial of defendant's constitutional
rights) ; Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 841 (1967) (Attorney General's discretion in prosecuting or abandon-
ing a prosecution held absolute); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171-72
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965) (United States Attorney held
to have discretionary power to refuse to sign an indictment); Goldberg v. Hoff-
man, 225 F.2d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 1955) (United States Attorney's insistence
on prosecuting individual for tax evasion when such proceedings might endanger
individual's life held within United States Attorney's discretion) ; United States v.
One 1940 Oldsmobile Sedan Auto., 167 F.2d 404, 406 (7th Cir. 1948) (District
Attorney's broad discretion to resubmit presentment to Grand Jury or to subsequent
grand juries not subject to court's control) ; United States v. Perkins, 383 F. Supp.
922, 928 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (defendant's motion to dismiss charges of illegal wire-
tapping on ground of selective prosecution denied despite existence of various similar
malfeasances by government) ; United States v. Manno, 118 F. Supp. 511, 515 (N.D.
Ill. 1954) (singling out of "racketeers" for prosecution for income tax evasion not
unconstitutionally discriminatory) ; Howell v. Brown, 85 F. Supp. 537, 539-40 (D.
Neb. 1949) (court denied motion to compel United States Attorney to bring a
prosecution, finding decision to be solely discretionary); United States v. Brokaw,
60 F. Supp. 100, 102 (S.D. Ill. 1945) (entering of order of nolle prosequi held to
be within sole discretion of prosecutor).
3. For cases affirming a prosecutorial decision whether to charge see, e.g., United
States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 784-85, 792-95 (1977); United States v. Smith,
523 F.2d 771, 782 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817 (1976) ; United States v.
Raven, 500 F.2d 728, 733 (5th Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Strutton, 494 F.2d 686,
688 (2d Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Hunter, 495 F.2d 205, 220-21 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. One 1940 Oldsmobile Sedan
Auto., 167 F.2d 404, 406 (7th Cir. 1948); United States v. Perkins, 383 F. Supp.
922, 928 (N.D. Ohio 1974) ; discussed at note 2 supra.
4. For cases affirming a prosecutorial decision not to charge see, e.g., United
States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 412-13 (1920) ; Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 454, 457 (1868) ; Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 841 (1967) ; discussed at note 2 supra.
5. For cases affirming what a prosecutor charged, see, e.g., United States v.
Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 1973) (where criminal statutes overlap, gov-
ernment's discretion to choose among them is limited only by requirement that choice
be nondiscriminatory) ; Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481 (D.C. Cir.
1967), discussed at note 2 supra.
6. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). See also Inmates of Attica Correctional
Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 381 (2d Cir. 1973) ; Peek v. Mitchell, 419 F.2d
575, 578 (6th Cir. 1970) ; Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234 (D.C. Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966) ; Moses v. Kennedy, 219 F. Supp. 762, 764
(D.D.C. 1963), aff'd sub nom. Moses v. Katzenbach, 342 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ;
Howell v. Brown, 85 F. Supp. 537, 538 (D. Neb. 1949); United States v. Brokaw,
60 F. Supp. 100, 101 (S.D. Ill. 1945).
7. See note 2 supra for cases refusing to compel a prosecutor to terminate a
prosecution.
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The judiciary has always been reluctant to circumscribe prosecu-
torial discretion.8 The reasons commonly cited in support of this
deference include the doctrine of separation of powers; ' the impossi-
bility of total enforcement of the laws; 10 the need for leniency in
particular cases; " and the prosecutor's, as opposed to the judge's, ex-
pertise.12  Chief Justice (then Circuit Judge) Burger once stated:
"Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by
the Executive of his discretion in deciding when and whether to insti-
tute criminal proceedings, or what precise charge shall be made, or
whether to dismiss a proceeding once brought." 13
Moreover, courts fear that in allowing challenges to the prose-
cutor's decisions, they will open up the "floodgates"-inviting a deluge
of spurious claims.' Courts also point out that the prosecutor's motive
8. Numerous commentators note the judicial tradition of reluctance to substitutejudicial for prosecutorial judgment. See, e.g., 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §9:1, at 218 (2d ed. 1979).
9. The doctrine of separation of powers is perhaps the most widely given reason
for lack of judicial interference with the prosecutor's exercise of discretion. Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), has been cited for the proposition that
the courts may compel an executive officer to perform an express duty imposed by
the Constitution or statute, but they have no power to control his conduct in matters
involving his discretion. For a case following Marbury, see Goldberg v. Hoffman,
225 F.2d 463, 465 (7th Cir. 1955). For cases applying separation of powers rea-
soning to prosecutorial discretion, see United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 569(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 941 (1979) ; United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d
1304, 1307 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ream, 491 F.2d 1243, 1246 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1974) ; Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375,
379-80 (2d Cir. 1973) ; United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965).
A related argument in this context is that of executive privilege. This was
claimed by the prosecutors in United States v. Cammisano, 546 F.2d 238, 240-41 (8th
Cir. 1976) ; United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1210 (2d Cir. 1974). These
cases are discussed in Part IV, infra. See also Comment, Defense Access to Evi-
dence of Discriminatory Prosecution, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 648, 660-61 (1974) (courts
must show direct evidence of discriminatory prosecution to override claim of executive
privilege).
10. For references to the impossibility of total enforcement of the laws, see,
e.g., Givelber, The Application of Equal Protection Principles to Selective Enforce-
ment of the Criminal Law, 1973 U. ILL. L.F. 88, 100-01; Case Comment, Curbing
the Prosecutor's Discretion: United States v. Falk, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
372, 373 (1974).
Of course, it can be argued that if total enforcement of the laws is impossible,
perhaps the laws should be revised in a more enforceable manner, (i.e., fewer laws,
with more resources allocated to enforcement of those laws).
11. For a reference to the need for leniency in particular cases, see, e.g., Givelber,
supra note 10, at 101-02. However, a persuasive argument can be made against this
rationale. One scholar argues that the result of discretionary leniency in enforce-
ment is, in fact, injustice or discrimination towards those who are not treated
leniently. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY, 670-72
(1970).
12. For a reference to a discussion of the prosecutor's expertise, see, e.g., Givel-
ber, supra note 10, at 192.
13. Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
14. The "opening of the floodgates of litigation" argument has been reiterated
often. The court in United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974),
expressed that fear, despite its order that the prosecutor turn over his files to the
district judge for in camera inspection and subsequent disclosure of relevant ma-
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is irrelevant to the ultimate issue of whether the defendant committed
the crime with which he or she is charged.15  In addition, judges often
allude to lack of judicial standards with which to measure or limit
prosecutorial discretion."
These beliefs have resulted in a tradition of judicial deference to
prosecutorial discretion, as well as in an overriding presumption of
prosecutorial good faith in the decision to charge.' 7 Selectivity in
prosecution has traditionally been upheld as a means of allowing the
prosecutor, who is unable to prosecute every violation of every law, to
best promote general compliance with the laws.'" Objective considera-
tions taken into account by the prosecutor include sufficiency of the
evidence to prove the government's case and the availability of wit-
nesses. 9 Subjective considerations are also factors in the decision,
including the seriousness of the crime, injury to the victim, the back-
ground of the defendant, the need for leniency in a particular case, the
terials to defense counsel. See also Moss v. Hornig, 314 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1963) ;
(proof that others have violated the law and have not been prosecuted could be
offered with respect to almost every lesser offense) ; Buxbom v. City of Riverside,
29 F. Supp. 3, 8 (S.D. Cal. 1939) (federal question not involved in decision not to
enjoin prosecution, even though others guilty of same offense not prosecuted, or
else every such case would be turned into a federal constitutional question);
Givelber, supra note 10, at 104 (due to flood of litigation argument judiciary not
responsive to unequal enforcement claims) ; Note, Discriminatory Enforcement of
Federal Penal Laws-United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973), 34 OHIO
ST. L.J. 942, 947-48 (1973) (allowing a diminished showing to establish an equal
protection claim of unlawful selective prosecution could subject courts to delays in
processing frivolous claims).
15. See Cardinale & Feldman, The Federal Courts and the Right to Non-
discriminatory Administration of the Criminal Law: A Critical View, 29 SYRacusn
L. REv. 659, 685-87 (1978). The authors are particularly critical of striking down
prosecutions because of improper prosecutorial motives, arguing that such action
immunizes conduct otherwise prohibited by statute and in effect punishes society.
They suggest that instead of striking down convictions of defendants who have been
discriminated against, courts instead consider other alternatives, such as leniency in
sentencing or sanctions for the prosecutors engaging in such conduct. Id. at 691-94.
See also Givelber, supra note 10, at 104; Case Comment, supra note 10, at 374-76.
16. The lack of judicial standards to circumscribe prosecutorial discretion, even
if such intervention were warranted, is mentioned in many cases. See the cases
listed in notes 2-7, supra. See also Givelber, supra note 10, at 191; Case Comment,
supra note 10, at 379-81.
17. All of the cases which have considered the issue of prosecutorial discrimi-
nation have at the very least paid lip service to the presumption of prosecutorial
good faith in the decision to charge. See, e.g., United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d
616, 620 (7th Cir. 1973).
Usually, the presumption of prosecutorial good faith is not overcome. See
United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 941
(1979) ; United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 943-45 (8th Cir. 1976) ; United States
v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 54 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976) ; United
States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182, 1196 (8th Cir.), application for stay of execution
and enforcement of judgment denied, 426 U.S. 917 (1976) ; United States v. Scherer,
523 F.2d 371, 377 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976).
18. See Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (decision to
prosecute requires determination that prosecution will promote the ends of justice,
instill respect for the law, and advance the cause of ordered liberty).
19. Id. at 635; Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion--A Re-Evaluation of the
Prosecutor's Unbridled Discretion and Its Potential for Abuse, 21 DEPAuL L. REV.
485, 493 (1971).
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need for immunization in a particular case, the deterrent value of
prosecuting a particular case, alternative remedies to a criminal prose-
cution, and testing the validity or bounds of a law.2"
Although, under our present system, the prosecutor must be al-
lowed to exercise some discretion, objections have been made to the
extent of this discretion. Some commentators have objected to the
20. Pugach, 193 F. Supp. at 634-35; Comment supra note 19, at 493. A good
summary of considerations the prosecutor should take into account in his or her
decision to charge may be found in American Bar Association Standards for Crimi-
nal Justice, §§ 3-3.8, -3.9 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. Project], which
provides for the following:
3-3.8 Discretion as to non-criminal disposition
(a) The prosecutor should explore the availability of noncriminal dis-
position, including programs of rehabilitation, formal or informal, in deciding
whether to press criminal charges. Especially in the case of a first offender,
the nature of the offense may warrant noncriminal disposition.
(b) Prosecutors should be familiar with the resources of social agencies
which can assist in the evaluation of cases for diversion from the criminal
process.
3-3.9 Discretion in the charging decision
(a) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute, or cause
to be instituted, or to permit the continued pendency of criminal charges
when it. is known that the charges are not supported by probable cause. A
prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the con-
tinued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible
evidence to support a conviction.
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evi-
dence might support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for
good cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, not-
withstanding that evidence exists which would support a conviction. Illus-
trative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in
exercising his discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact
guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to
the particular offense or the offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant;
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction
of others;
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another juris-
diction.
(c) In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no
weight to the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which might
be involved or to a desire to enhance his record of conviction.
(d) In cases which involve a serious threat to the community, the
prosecutor should not be deterred from prosecution by the fact that in the
jurisdiction juries have tended to acquit persons accused of the particular
kind of criminal act in question.
(e) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in number
or degree than he can reasonably support with evidence at trial.
A.B.A. Project at 3.52-54.
See also United States Department of Justice: Principles of Federal Prosecution
5-15 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Principles] for another exposition of considerations
the prosecutor should take into account in deciding whether or not to charge. It
should be noted, however, that the focus in Principles is on considerations in de-
clining to prosecute.
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courts' rubber stamping of all prosecutorial decisions.2 The virtually
unbridled discretion exercised by the prosecutor has been the cause for
some concern.2" Critics have pointed to the potential for, and the
reality of, abuse,2" charging that discretionary enforcement detracts
from the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, 4 violates the prin-
ciple of fair notice,2 and frustrates the will of the people.2 1 Professor
Davis, a particularly articulate critic of uncontrolled prosecutorial
power, has pointed out an inconsistency-other administrative dis-
cretion is reviewable, while the prosecutor's decision is left relatively
unhampered.
2 7
Although the concerns about the prosecutor's broad discretion
have largely gone unanswered, 28 the prosecutor is not entirely free in
21. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 209-10 (1969).
22. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AM. JuD. Soc'v 18, 19 (1940) noted
the prosecutor's extreme power, and its possibility for abuse. See also DAvIs, supra
note 21 at 209-10; Comment, supra note 19, at 497-98; Case Comment, supra
note 10, at 379; Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials,
1976 DUKE L.J. 651, 652-53; Givelber, supra note 10, at 106 Comment, supra note
9, at 661.
23. For references to abuse caused by unbridled discretion, see the sources
listed in note 22 supra.
24. Givelber, supra note 10, at 100.
25. Id. at 98.
26. Id. at 96. The people's will is frustrated by the fact that laws are enacted
to be enforced across the board, and when laws cease to be enforced, they probably
should not be perpetuated.
27. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATvE LAW TREATISE § 9.2, 223 (2d ed. 1979).
28. There are a few alternatives to judicially supervising the discretion exercised
by the prosecutor. One alternative would call for a restructuring of our present
criminal justice system, and would therefore be unlikely to be seriously considered.
Nevertheless, an exhaustive review and amendment or repeal of many existing laws
would help serve to limit the enforcement problem we currently face. Many laws,
e.g., consensual sex crimes, are rarely, if ever, enforced. These laws could be
amended or repealed. Of course, the legislature would have to take extreme action
here, i.e., repeal many laws, and, given our currently expanding Criminal Code, it
appears improbable that legislators would be willing to repeal rather than enact laws.
Another alternative for narrowing prosecutorial discretion would be to require
total enforcement of all the laws. This alternative is likewise untenable, because it
would require an extremely high increase in governmental resources allocated to law
enforcement. Total enforcement would undoubtedly result in higher taxes and,
given the present state of the economy and taxpayers' reluctance and hostility towards
any increase in taxes, this alternative is not feasible. Of course, it seems irrational
to enact so many laws and then be unwilling to pay for their enforcement.
The most reasonable alternative for controlling prosecutorial discretion is to
require that prosecutor's offices promulgate and follow guidelines for exercising their
discretion. Even with guidelines, the prosecutor is still exercising discretion; how-
ever, the discretion so exercised has the virtue of being reasoned and clear. The
American Bar Association and the United States Justice Department, among other
authorities, support internal prosecutorial guidelines.
The A.B.A. has stated that "the prosecutor should establish standards and pro-
cedures for evaluating complaints to determine whether criminal proceedings should
be instituted." §3-3.4(c), at 3.44.
The A.B.A. has further stated that
(a) Each prosecutor's office should develop a statement of
(i) general policies to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
and
(ii) procedures of the office.
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exercising discretion. For example, a prosecutor may not prosecute
cases in a discriminatory manner, or for vindictive or retaliatory pur-
poses. Nor may a prosecutor bring criminal charges for civil objec-
tives.29  Although there is no right to violate a governmental statute,
there is a right to equal treatment in the enforcement of the statute."0
This article will explore the issue of when an exercise of prose-
cutorial discretion will be deemed by the courts to be "discriminatory"
or "selective", in violation of the constitutional guarantee of equal
protection. After discussing the historical development of the doctrine,
this article will attempt to define what constitutes discriminatory en-
forcement in light of all relevant federal case law. The final sections
will outline the presentation of a defendant's claim of discriminatory
enforcement and offer some observations, conclusions, and suggestions.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The foundation of the doctrine of discriminatory enforcement can
be traced back to an early equal protection clause case, Yick Wo v.
Hopkins."' The petitioner in Yick Wo was convicted of violating an
1880 San Francisco municipal ordinance which made it a misdemeanor
to maintain a laundry without first obtaining the consent of a municipal
board of supervisors, unless the laundry was in a building constructed
of either brick or stone."2 The petitioner, a Chinese citizen, introduced
undisputed evidence showing that more than 150 Chinese citizens
operating laundries in wooden buildings had been arrested on the
The objectives of these policies as to discretion and procedures should
be to achieve a fair, efficient, and effective enforcement of criminal law.
(b) In the interest of continuity and clarity, such statement of policies and
procedures should be maintained in an office handbook. This handbook
should be available to the public, except for subject matters declared "con-
fidential," when it is reasonably believed that public access to their contents
would adversely affect the prosecution function.
A.B.A. Project, supra note 20, § 3-2.5, at 3.24-25. See also Principles, supra note
20 at 1-4 (principles of federal prosecution set forth to promote the reasoned exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion; internal office procedures should be established).
It should be noted that the major concern in this paper is the discretion in the
prosecutorial decision whether to charge. For a discussion of controlling the prose-
cutor's discretion in determining what to charge, see Vorenberg, supra note 22, at
678-83. A further discussion of prosecutorial guidelines, and how they relate to the
issue of prosecutorial discrimination, may be found in Part IV, infra.
29. J. Vorenberg, Prosecutorial Discretion (1980) (unpublished materials for
course on Government Lawyer, Harvard Law School).
30. Note, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws,
61 CoLUM. L. Rav. 1103, 1111 (1961). Cf. East Coast Ltimber Terminal, Inc. v.
Town of Babylon, 174 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1949) (the fourteenth amendment
deals with both the enforcement of invalid laws and the unequal enforcement of valid
laws) ; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (the fifth amendment guar-
antees the same equal protection by federal officials as the fourteenth amendment
guarantees by state officials).
31. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
32. Id. at 358.
19821
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charge of carrying on business without the special consent of the board
of supervisors, while the non-Chinese operators of more than 80 other
laundries operated in wood buildings had not been arrested.33  In
addition, it was admitted that the petitioner and 200 of his countrymen
similarly situated had sought permission to continue their businesses in
the various houses which they had been occupying and using for
laundries for more than 20 years. All of these petitions were denied,
and all of the petitions of those who were not Chinese, except for one,
were granted. 4
The Court condemned the ordinance because it granted a "naked
and arbitrary power to give or withhold consent, not only as to places,
but as to persons." " Although the Court did not find the ordinance
void on its face, it held that the administration of the ordinance vio-
lated the equal protection guaranteed to petitioners by the fourteenth
amendment because the board was arbitrarily and unjustly discrimi-
nating on the basis of race and nationality. The Court concluded:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in ap-
pearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public au-
thority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically
to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitu-
tion.386
Although Yick Wo involved the discriminatory administration of
a law on the part of a licensing board, its holding was read and ex-
panded in the 1944 case of Snowden v. Hughes "' to generally cover
33. Id. at 359.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 366.
36. Id. at 373-74.
37. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557-58 (1965), the Court stated
it is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine which
expressions of view will be permitted and which will not or to engage in
invidious discrimination among persons or groups either by the use of a
statute providing a system of broad discretionary licensing power or, as in
this case, the equivalent of such a system by selective enforcement of an
extremely broad prohibitory statute.
Also, in Niemotko v. Md., 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951), the Court held: "It thus
becomes apparent that the lack of standards in the license-issuing 'practice' a prior
restraint in contravention of the fourteenth amendment, and that the completely
arbitrary and discriminatory refusal to grant the permits was a denial of equal pro-
tection." And in Fowler v. R.I., 345 U.S. 67 (1953), the concurring opinion would
have found an equal protection violation in a municipal ordinance applied to penalize
a minister of one religious group for preaching at a peaceful religious meeting in a
public park, while other religious groups were being allowed to conduct religious
services there with impunity. Id. at 70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
38. 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944). In Snowden, the Court held that a state statute
neutral on its face, is open to attack if invidious and purposefully discriminatory
application is shown. See also East Coast Lumber Terminal, Inc. v. Town of
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the discriminatory administration of laws. Yick Wo also involved
discriminatory action on the part of local officials. It is now settled
that federal officials are also subject to the same duty of nondiscrimi-
nation in the administration of laws.39
After Yick Wo, judicial relief was not granted to enjoin a city
and its officials from discriminatorily enforcing its laws until City of
Evansville v. Gaseteria.° In that case, Gaseteria, the appellee, success-
fully brought an equity action to enjoin the city and its officers, the
appellants, from interfering with appellee's installation of a gasoline
filling station. Among other administrative actions, appellants revoked
appellee's permit for its gasoline station, allegedly for the reason that
its underground storage tanks exceeded ordinance limits. There was
evidence, however, that "under substantially like circumstances . . .
various others ha[d] been permitted to make and maintain large in-
stallations, far in excess of alleged ordinance limits, both before and
after these occurrences, and they ha[d] been in no manner disturbed
by the city or its officials." "' In addition, there was undisputed evi-
dence that appellants' actions were taken for the purpose of preventing
appellee, as they had prevented a number of others, from cutting the
price of gasoline within the city. The Seventh Circuit agreed with
the lower court that appellants evidenced a definite purpose and plan
of discriminating unlawfully against appellee's installation. The court
found appellant's actions violative of the fourteenth amendment and
affirmed the lower court's decree granting the injunction. 42
At first blush it may appear somewhat odd that the Gaseteria court
would find an equal protection violation based on the city officials' at-
tempt to prevent the price cutting of gasoline. The Supreme Court in
Yick Wo based its finding of an equal protection violation on a licens-
ing classification that distinguished between race and nationality. In
Gaseteria no such "invidious" discrimination had been alleged. A few
Babylon, 174 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1949) (unequal enforcement of valid laws
within scope of fourteenth amendment). Cf. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347
(1880) (no agency or officers of the state shall deny equal protection of the laws to
persons within the state's jurisdiction).
The expansion of Yick Wo has been criticized by Cardinale and Feldman, The
Federal Courts and the Right to Nondiscriminatory Administration of the Criminal
Law: A Critical View, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 659, 661-62 (1978). The authors are
particularly critical of judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion as opposed
to a licensing board's discretion. They argue that the doctrine of separation of
powers requires much greater prosecutorial freedom from judicial interference.
39. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (the fifth amendment guarantees
the same equal protection by federal officials as the fourteenth amendment guaran-
tees by state officials); Washington v. United States, 401 F.2d 915, 922-23 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (the fifth amendment due process clause contains the same "protection of
equal laws" pledge as does the fourteenth amendment).
40. 51 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1931).
41. Id. at 237.
42. Id.
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explanations account for the outcome of this case. In the first place,
the undisputed facts of Gaseteria showed that rather extraordinary and
dishonest measures had been taken by the city officials to prevent the
appellee from installing its station.43  Secondly, the court was enjoining
administrative licensing rather than prosecutorial action. Although
the holding of Yick Wo was eventually found applicable to discrimina-
tory prosecutions, 44 there was nevertheless extreme judicial reluctance
to examine the motives of prosecutorial decisions. As a result, it was
not until the late 1960's that any prosecutions were successfully en-
joined, indictments dismissed, or convictions overturned as a result of
claims of prosecutorial discrimination.45  The third most important
factor that probably influenced the court's decision in Gaseteria was
the judicial doctrine in the so-called "Lochner Era." 46 It has been ob-
served that judicial opinions were informed by conservative economic
theory and hostility toward labor regulation.47 The court in Gaseteria
found the city's purpose of preventing price cutting of gasoline within
the city to be improper and its actions in that regard violative of the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection.4 1 It seems un-
likely that a court would reach the same conclusion today.49
43. Id. at 233-35. The court concluded:
It thus appears that the prior pretexts upon which the carrying on of
this work was resisted and stopped, after the permit had been granted, viz.,
misrepresentation to the fire marshal as to location outside of the fire limits,
the contention of excavation of alley, which culminated in stopping the work
and the arrest of Williams and others of appellee's employees and the claim
that appellee had unlawfully crossed the alley with pipes, were all abandoned
by the city, and the revocation was predicated wholly upon appellee's al-
leged transgression of the [storage of petroleum] ordinance.
44. For a discussion of the expansion of the Yick Wo holding to discriminatory
prosecutions, see notes 52-56 infra and accompanying text.
45. For cases of successful claims of discriminatory prosecution, see the cases
discussed in Part III, infra. Cases which demonstrate judicial reluctance and/or
refusal to question prosecutorial decisions include: United States v. Thompson, 251
U.S. 407 (1920) ; Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454 (1868) ; Goldberg v.
Hoffman, 225 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1955) ; United States v. One 1940 Oldsmobile
Sedan Auto., 167 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1948); Howell v. Brown, 85 F. Supp. 537 (D.
Neb. 1949); United States v. Brokaw, 60 F. Supp. 100 (S.D. Ill. 1945). For a
more detailed discussion of the judiciary's reluctance to examine prosecutorial deci-
sions, see notes 2-20 supra and accompanying text.
46. The "Lochner Era" may be defined as the period beginning around the turn
of the century with Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), and ending in the
mid-1930's with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). L. TRrfE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 434-35 (1978).
47. Id. at 435. A conservative economic perspective would be hostile to gov-
ernmental interference with "free market" competition. In Gaseteria, 51 F.2d at
233, the city feared that appellee would engage in price cutting and it attempted to
prevent appellee from engaging in such action.
48. Id. at 237. It should be noted that in addition to Yick Wo, the court cited
as support for its holding Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904) (municipal
ordinance fixing time limits within which gas works could be erected struck down
as unlawful exercise of police power). 51 F.2d at 237.
49. Although a return to the "Lochner Era" appears unlikely, the growing con-
servative trend in the country may cast doubt upon the validity of this assertion.
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The Gaseteria decision is not representative of the type of case
which followed Yick Wo v. Hopkins. Although both decisions con-
cerned licensing, Yick Wo's continued vitality has been far more gen-
eral, applying to other forms of discriminatory state action.50 This
section will focus on the development of the discriminatory enforcement
holding in Yick Wo and its application to the area of prosecutorial
discretion in charging.
Before the 1960's, there were not many cases in which defendants
alleged that their prosecutions were violative of equal protection. 51
The courts were initially divided on the applicability of the Yick Wo
rule to prosecutorial discrimination. While many courts failed to reach
or even address the issue,' 2 other courts indicated that the rule was
not applicable to prosecutorial decisions." 3 Even though no court re-
versed a conviction for discriminatory prosecution until 1969,' 4 one
court in 1932 " found the Yick Wo holding applicable to prosecutorial
discrimination. After the Supreme Court in Snowden v. Hughes 57
acknowledged the general applicability of the Yick Wo holding to the
unequal or discriminatory application of state statutes, there were some
challenges to prosecutions on equal protection grounds. The challenges
were consistently unsuccessful; typically the courts would assert that it
was no defense that others were violating with impunity the law under
which the defendant had been indicted or convicted.
58
50. For a discussion of the expansion of Yick Wo, see text accompanying note
38 supra.
51. This paper concerns equal protection challenges to prosecutions in federal
courts. No attempt has been made to document such challenges in state courts.
52. Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357 (1953) ; Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S.
183 (1900) ; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890) ; United States ex rel.
Plue v. Cummings, 224 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Sanders v. Waters, 199 F.2d 317
(10th Cir. 1952); Glicker v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 160 F.2d 96 (6th
Cir. 1947) ; City of Evansville v. Gaseteria, 51 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1931) ; United
States v. Palermo, 152 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1957) ; Broad-Grace Arcade Corp.
v. Bright, 48 F.2d 348 (E.D. Va. 1931).
53. Grell v. United States, 112 F.2d 861, 875-76 (8th Cir. 1940); Saunders v.
Lowry, 58 F.2d 158, 159 (5th Cir. 1932) ; United States v. Manno, 118 F. Supp.
511, 515 (N.D. Ill. 1945) ; Buxbom v. City of Riverside, 29 F. Supp. 3, 18 (S.D.
Cal. 1939).
54. United States v. Robinson, 311 F. Supp. 1063, 1065-66 (W.D. Mo. 1969)
(systematic violation by government of wiretapping statutes and application of
statutes to private detective represents unjust discrimination in statutes' enforcement).
55. Boynton v. Fox West Coast Theatres Corp., 60 F.2d 851, 853-54 (10th Cir.
1932). The plaintiffs in Boynton were theatre owners in one county who challenged
the enforcement of the Sunday closing law against them because county attorneys in
other counties were not enforcing the law.
56. Id. The court in Boynton nevertheless rejected the theatre owners' claim,
finding that they had failed to prove discrimination in violation of equal protection
of the law. Id. at 854.
57. 321 U.S. 1, 11 (1944). See note 38 supra and accompanying text for a
discussion of Snowden.
58. For typical unsuccessful challenges, see, e.g., Grell v. United States, 112
F.2d 861, 875 (8th Cir. 1940) (fraudulent schemes to obtain contracts) ; Saunders
v. Lowry, 58 F.2d 158, 159 (5th Cir. 1932) (accepting bribes); United States v.
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It was not until 1962 that the Supreme Court actually addressed
the issue of "discriminatory prosecution." " In Oyler v. Boles,"0 the
Court considered a challenge to the administration of West Virginia's
habitual criminal statute. The statute "provide[d] for mandatory life
sentence upon the third conviction 'of a crime punishable by confine-
ment in a penitentiary.' " 61 The petitioners, both sentenced to life
imprisonment under the statute, 62 claimed a denial of equal protection
because the prosecuting authorities sought to enforce the statute only
in a minority of cases where the statutory standards were satisfied.63
Thus, the petitioners argued that they had been denied equal protection
with respect to other three-time offenders who had not been prosecuted
under the statute.4
The Supreme Court noted that the petitioners had not alleged
"whether the failure to proceed against other three-time offenders was
due to lack of knowledge of the prior offenses on the part of the prose-
cutors or was the result of a deliberate policy of proceeding only in a
certain class of cases or against specific persons." 65 Acknowledging
that the statistics showed that a high percentage of those subject to the
law had not been proceeded against, the Court concluded:
[T]he conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement
is not in itself a federal constitutional violation. Even
though the statistics in this case might imply a policy of
selective enforcement, it was not stated that the selection was
deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification. Therefore grounds
supporting a finding of a denial of equal protection were not
alleged.6"
Palermo, 152 F. Supp. 825, 828 (E.D. Pa. 1957) (tax avoidance). See also
Thompson v. Spear, 91 F.2d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 762
(1938) (no denial for equal protection where commission made diligent effort to
enforce laws fairly and impartially but unable to do so).
59. In Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 359 (1953), the Supreme Court
indicated that a showing of systematic or intentional discrimination would have been
a defense to the defendant's criminal prosecution, had it been shown. The Court,
however, did not reach the issue, since the case had already been disposed of on
state procedural grounds. See also Two Guys v. McGinley, Inc., 366 U.S. 582,
588-89 (1961), in which the Court noted the possibility of a defense of discriminatory
prosecution.
60. 386 U.S. 448 (1962).
61. Id. at 449 (citing W. VA. CODE § 6130 (1961)).
62. 368 U.S. at 449-51.
63. Id. at 455.
64. Id. at 455-56.
65. Id. at 456.
66. Id.
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Put in a modern context, the challenge in Oyler failed for want of a
showing of intentional discrimination.67
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Oyler v. Boles, there has
been a dramatic increase in the number of cases in which defendants
or prospective defendants have alleged that their prosecutions were, or
that threatened prosecutions would be, violative of equal protection.
The following section attempts to discern from this mass of cases
exactly what constitutes unconstitutional prosecutorial discrimination.
III. THE ELEMENTS OF THE DISCRIMINATORY PROSECUTION DEFENSE
The elements of a defense of discriminatory prosecution are that
others, similarly situated, have not been prosecuted and that the govern-
ment's selection of the particular defendant for prosecution has been
invidious or in bad faith, that is, based upon such impermissible con-
siderations as race, religion or the desire to prevent the exercise of
constitutional rights. 68  The classic statement of the discriminatory
defense is found in United States v. Berrios,6" and has been widely, if
not universally, adopted. 70  The following subsections will examine in
detail the substantive requirements of the defense.7'
A. Element 1: Nonprosecution of Others Similarly Situated
This element may be thought of as a threshold requirement for
establishing the defense. The requirement of showing unequal treat-
ment between persons similarly situated has its historic base in Yick
67. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (equal pro-
tection challenge requires a showing of intentional or purposeful discrimination).
68. In United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974), the court
stated :
To support a defense of selective or discriminatory prosecution, a de-
fendant bears the heavy burden of establishing, at least prima facie, (1) that,
while others similarly situated have not generally been proceeded against
because of conduct of the type forming the basis of the charge against him,
he has been singled out for prosecution, and (2) that the government's
discriminatory selection of him for prosecution has been invidious or in bad
faith, i.e., based upon such impermissible considerations as race, religion, or
the desire to prevent his exercise of constitutional rights. These two essen-
tial elements are sometimes referred to as "intentional and purposeful dis-
crimination."
69. Id.
70. For cases adopting the Berrios restatement, see, e.g., United States v. Stout,
601 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979); United States v.
Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1308 (5th Cir. 1978) ; United States v. Bourque, 541 F.2d
290, 293 (1st Cir. 1976) ; United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 542 F.2d 655, 658
(6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977) ; United States v. Oaks, 527 F.2d
937, 940 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976) ; United States v.
Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205, 1208-09 (8th Cir. 1975) ; United States v. Ortega-Alvarez,
506 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
71. See Cardinale & Feldman, supra note 15, at 668-76 for an interesting exami-
nation of and commentary on the substantive requirements of the defense.
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Wo v. Hopkins,7 2 in which the petitioner showed that with respect to
all of those similarly situated, the law prohibiting the operation of
laundries in wooden structures was being enforced only against
Chinese persons. In all cases where the discriminatory prosecution
defense has prevailed, the defendant has successfully proved that the
government is not proceeding against others, and that these others
are "similarly situated" by virtue of having committed the same
offense.
73
The nebulous concept of persons "similarly situated" was de-
veloped in a line of cases involving the Sunday closing laws. The
Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of the Sunday closing
laws, also indicating that states could create reasonable exceptions to
the laws without running afoul of the equal protection clause.74  Sev-
eral years later, in Zayre of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,7' suit
was brought seeking an injunction to require the city to enforce its
Sunday closing law 76 in a nondiscriminatory manner. The petitioner's
chief complaint was that "drug stores" carrying many of the same
items sold by the petitioners were allowed to remain open on Sundays,
while the petitioners were not.77  The district court noted the com-
petitive advantage an establishment could gain by labeling itself a
"drug" store rather than a "department" store.78
72. For a discussion of Yick Wo, see notes 31-36 supra and accompanying text.
73. For a discussion of several cases in which the first element of the discrimi-
natory prosecution defense was met, see text accompanying notes 106-25 infra.
74. McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) (exempted com-
modities necessary either for health of populace or enhancement of recreational
atmosphere of day) ; Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366
U.S. 582, 585 (1961) (works of charity and necessity, delivery of milk, wholesome
recreation and work in connection with rendering service by a public utility exempted).
75. 276 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
76. The statute provided: "'Any person who shall pursue his business or the
work of his ordinary calling on the Lord's day, works of necessity or charity only
excepted, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.'" 276 F. Supp. at 893 (quoting GA.
CODE § 26-6905 (1958)).
77. 276 F. Supp. at 893-94. The court explained that while the statute itself
excepted works of necessity or charity, various activities, including the operation of
dance halls and movie theaters and the promotion of athletic events such as baseball,
football and automobile racing, had also been exempted by subsequent legislation.
Other activities, including the sale of gasoline, drugs and food for consumption, had
been exempted by judicial decision. 276 F. Supp. at 893. It was also stipulated
that drug stores carrying consumer goods from A to Z are allowed to stay
open on Sundays and to sell all their wares, not just drugs; that drive-in
groceries which carry almost every article of food which the consumer may
have forgotten to purchase during the other six days of the week remain
open on Sunday; that the [city] operates recreational facilities which sell
tennis and golf equipment; that the [city] licenses and operation of shops
which sell lighters, clothes and other consumer durables in the [city's]
municipal airport; and that television repairmen are left free to follow their
ordinary course of business on Sunday.
Id. at 893-94.
78. 276 F. Supp. at 893.
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The court concluded that while a municipality can create reason-
able exceptions to its Sunday closing law, it may not carve out ex-
ceptions through selective enforcement of the state statute. The court,
in issuing the injunction requested by the petitioners, held that under
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the city's enforcement policy must be applied in
a fair and nondiscriminatory manner. 9 However, the court's opinion
is rather unclear with respect to what exactly constitutes nondiscrimi-
natory enforcement in this context.
Several years after the first Zayre case, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit clarified what constituted unconstitutional
selective enforcement in the context of the Sunday closing laws. In
Zayre of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Marietta,"0 the department stores
appealed a denial of their motion to broaden a preliminary injunction
issued against the discriminatory enforcement of a Sunday closing
law."' The original injunction had been issued as a result of the
plaintiffs' allegations that they were being denied equal protection of
the laws: Plaintiffs claimed to have been threatened with prosecution
and revocation of their business licenses for remaining open in viola-
tion of the statute, while other business establishments selling many
of the same items "in direct competition" with the department store
had been allowed to conduct business on Sunday without threat of
prosecution or revocation of licenses.8 2
After their initial victory, the plaintiffs in Zayre sought to broaden
the preliminary injunction so as to include the alleged discriminatory
enforcement of the statute with respect to other businesses or occupa-
tions not directly in competition with the appellants. The lower court
refused to do so,' finding "a great difference between discriminatory
enforcement of a statute and non-discriminatory non-enforcement." 81
The Fifth Circuit agreed that the appellants did not have standing
to assert a denial of equal protection with respect to the nonenforce-
ment of the statute toward noncompetitive businesses.8 ' The court
noted that Yick Wo, unlike the instant case, involved discrimination
based on race between two classes in direct economic competition with
each other.8 6 However, after the granting of the preliminary injunc-
tion, there was no longer any inequality of treatment among those in
direct economic competition. Consequently, the court found Yick Wo
79. Id. at 894.
80. 416 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 918 (1970).
81. 416 F.2d at 252.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 253.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 253-54.
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inapplicable because those allegedly receiving preferential treatment
were not in similar circumstances to the appellants.8 7  Since discrimi-
nation had not been shown to exist in enforcement between parties
"similarly situated," the court agreed that no relief could be afforded
to the appellants.8"
Judge Boyle, writing in dissent,89 argued that all businesses or
occupations which were violating the statute were "similarly situated"
with respect to the appellants." He would have enlarged the injunc-
tion to prevent what he perceived to be discriminatory enforcement.
The conclusion to be drawn from the Zayre cases is that for the
purposes of the Sunday closing laws, "similarly situated" means busi-
nesses engaged in direct economic competition-the same type of busi-
ness or businesses that sell the same items or conduct the same
activities. Different businesses, although both theoretically subject to
enforcement of the closing laws, are not "similarly situated." 91 In
addition, the "same" businesses in different geographic areas are not
similarly situated. 2 Thus, the standards to be met in showing that
others are "similarly situated" are stringent.
The Sunday closing law cases were decided before Berrios and a
majority of other discriminatory prosecution cases.98 The rule dis-
cernible from Berrios and the various other discriminatory prosecution
cases is consistent with the Sunday closing law cases. The defendant
must allege and offer evidence tending to show that the government,
aware of others committing the same or similar offenses as the de-
87. Id. at 254.
88. Id.
89. 416 F.2d 252, 254 (Boule, J., dissenting).
90. Judge Boyle concluded:
Thus, those "similarly situated" in this case are all persons pursuing
their regular business or calling, other than in the spheres of charity or
necessity. The statute applies to "any person" and, therefore, those "similarly
situated," for purposes of this statute, are "all persons" and are those entitled
to be treated alike. The fact that a retail merchant is more "similarly
situated" with other retail merchants, for example, than he is with a florist
or pet shop operator, does not compel the conclusion that the retail merchant
and the florist and the pet shop operator are not "similarly situated" so far
as this statute is concerned. To hold otherwise is to read Yick Wo v.
Hopkins . . . too narrowly.
416 F.2d at 255.
91. Zayre v. Marietta, 416 F. Supp. at 254. See also Broad-Grace Arcade
Corp. v. Bright, 48 F.2d 348, 351 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 284 U.S. 588 (1931) (court
rejected contention that enforcement of Sunday law against miniature golf course
operator was arbitrary discrimination denying equal protection because government
failed to enforce it against persons engaged in other activities in same locality).
92. See Boynton v. Fox West Coast Theatres Corp., 60 F.2d 851, 854 (10th
Cir. 1932) (enforcement of Sunday law against theatres held not to involve denial
of equal protection of law, even though county attorneys in other counties were not
enforcing law).
93. Most of the discriminatory prosecution cases were decided in the 1970's.
United States v. Robinson, 311 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D. Mo. 1969), was the first case
in which a conviction was reversed on the grounds of discriminatory prosecution.
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fendant, has not prosecuted those others, but has "singled out" the
defendant or a class of defendants for prosecution. Governmental or
prosecutorial knowledge of the other violators appears to be crucial to
the defense."
Failure to make the allegation that others similarly situated are
not being prosecuted will result in a rejection of the defense.95 The
mere allegation that others are committing the same offense is insuffi-
cient." Similarly, evidence that another person previously committed
the same crime and was not prosecuted will not support the claim.9"
In addition to showing that others have committed the same crime or
have engaged in similar conduct, evidence must be presented that they
are not being and have not been prosecuted. There must be more
than the mere possibility that others will not be prosecuted.9" There-
fore, evidence of other prosecutions will generally obviate the claim.99
A showing of few or no prior prosecutions of a particular crime, with-
out more, is likewise insufficient.'
The "others not being prosecuted" must be engaged in basically
the same act as the defendant,' 0 ' thereby committing the same crime
or violating the same statute. 0 2  Even if persons are violating the
94. For cases which show that the government's knowledge of other violators
is crucial, see text accompanying notes 106-25 infra.
95. United States v. Bourque, 541 F.2d 290, 293 (1st Cir. 1976); United States
v. Dawson, 400 F.2d 194, 204 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969)
United States v. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64, 77 (D.D.C. 1979).
96. See United States v. Kelly, 556 F.2d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1017 (1978) (defendant claimed DEA officials committed some offenses as
he, a Customs Service employee, and Justice Department decided to prosecute Cus-
toms Service and not DEA). See also United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp. 393,
405 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (allegation that everyone was engaging in similar conduct was
held insufficient).
97. United States Labor Party v. Oremus, 619 F.2d 683, 690-91 (7th Cir. 1980).
98. United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 860 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 41
U.S. 970 (1973) (mere possibility that similar cases will be treated more leniently
did not support claim of discriminatory prosecution).
99. The following cases show that even as few as 2-3 other prosecutions will
preclude a successful discriminatory prosecution defense: United States v. Kahl, 583
F.2d 1351, 1353-54 (5th Cir. 1978) ; United States v. Oaks, 527 F.2d 937, 939-40
(9th Cir. 1975) ; Rhinehart v. Rhay, 440 F.2d 718, 727 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 825 (1971); United States v. Carson, 434 F. Supp. 806, 809 (D. Conn. 1977).
100. United States v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 576 F.2d 388, 395 (1st
Cir. 1978).
101. United States v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 1079, 1086 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 868 (1978) (defendants convicted for misapplying bank funds while those who
made nominee loans escaped prosecution) ; United States v. Cantu, 557 F.2d 1173,
1177-78 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978) (defendant convicted of
"shielding" illegal aliens while others who employed illegal aliens not prosecuted);
United States v. Smith, 523 F.2d 771, 782 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
817 (1976) (prosecutor could prosecute filing of false Medicare statements while
not prosecuting Medicare form mistakes) ; Georgia v. Mitchell, 450 F.2d 1317, 1321
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (Attorney General could prosecute de jure segregation and fail
to prosecute de facto segregation).
102. In United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 571 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 941 (1979), the defendant charged that only Democrats were being in-
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same statute or ordinance, a difference in the magnitude of the violation
may, nevertheless, mean that the persons are not similarly situated' 0 3
Although different courts have varied in their definition of "simi-
larly situated," 104 the common thread in all of the cases is a showing
that the government or prosecutor, with the knowledge 'o' that other
people are engaging in substantially the same conduct as the defendant
or class of defendants and thus violating the same statute, does not
prosecute the others, but instead singles out the defendant or class of
defendants for prosecution. An examination of several cases in which
the defense was successfully raised will serve to illustrate the point.
In United States v. Robinson,'0 6 a private detective challenged his
conviction for violating wiretapping statutes. The defendant presented
a substantial amount of documentary evidence which showed that al-
though government officials were engaging in systematic violations of
the same statutes that the defendant had violated, no government official
had ever been prosecuted. The defendant included in his evidence 10T
references to such cases as Katz v. United States,10 8 Alderman v. United
States,'19 Desist v. United States,"0 and Olmstead v. United States,"'
dicted for extortion. However, the court found that the defendant had not made a
sufficient prima facie showing inasmuch as there was no evidence that Republicans
were engaging in the same conduct as the defendant, that is, extortion of a particu-
lar group of persons, equipment lessors to the Pennsylvania Department of Trans-
portation. 602 F.2d at 571. See also Wheaton v. Hagan, 435 F. Supp. 1134, 1148-
49 (M.D.N.C. 1977) (policy of arresting possessors of marijuana while not arresting
possessors of alcoholic beverages in public place was not nonprosecution of others
similarly situated).
103. Cook v. City of Price, 566 F.2d 699, 701-02 (10th Cir. 1977).
104. Cardinale & Feldman, supra note 15, at 669. The authors cite for support,
at 669 n.72, United States v. Kelly, 556 F.2d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 1977) (similar
offenses) ; United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 955 (1976) (others generally have not been prosecuted for conduct similar
to conduct for which defendant was prosecuted); United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d
1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974) (other persons who have not been proceeded against
because of conduct of the type forming basis of charge) ; United States v. Stagman,
446 F.2d 489, 494 (6th Cir. 1971) (persons committing similar offenses committed
in approximately same time and area) ; United States v. Dawson, 400 F.2d 194, 204
(2d Cir. 1968) (except for being prosecuted, defendant must be identically situated
with other violators); United States v. Robinson, 311 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (W.D.
Mo. 1969) (similarity of circumstances).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Baechler, 509 F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 993 (1975) (failure of government to prosecute all evaders of
Selective Service Act could have been due to lack of knowledge).
106. 311 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
107. Id. at 1064-66.
108. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (warrant requirement for electronic surveillance by
government).
109. 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (suppression of evidence obtained through illegal elec-
tronic surveillance by government).
110. 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (prospective application of Katz v. United States to
electronic surveillance by government).
111. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (former law with respect to evidence obtained through
electronic surveillance by government).
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and various authorities 12 and Senate hearings "' from which there
could be drawn only one conclusion-the government was, with im-
punity, knowingly and systematically violating the wiretap statutes.1
4
Surprisingly, the fact that the unprosecuted violators were government
officials did not negate the fact that they were similarly situated to
the defendant.2"
In United States v. Steele,"' the defendant, convicted for failure
to complete the 1970 census form, showed that in Hawaii there had
been only four prosecutions for failure to complete the census." 7 Addi-
tionally, the defendant alleged that other people who had not completed
the form had not been prosecuted. 1 8 The government's recording
procedure showed who had and who had not complied with the law."'
The defendant was able to locate six other persons who had refused to
complete the form, but who had not been prosecuted. 20 While those
six had not taken a public stand on the issue, the only four individuals
prosecuted had actively participated, as did the defendant, in a census
resistance movement.' 2 ' The defendant in Steele was therefore success-
ful in showing that others similarly situated had not been prosecuted.' 2 2
Finally, in United States v. Falk,'2 3 the first element of the defense
was met by evidence that the government, aware of over 25,000 vio-
lations of the Selective Service laws, had a written policy of non-
enforcement, 124 and that the government had nevertheless prosecuted
the defendant, an active member of a draft counseling organization,
for violating those laws.
2 5
The information necessary to show that others similarly situated
have not been prosecuted is usually in the hands of the prosecutor or
the government, if it exists at all.'12  Thus, the defendant, who bears
112. See United States v. Robinson, 311 F. Supp. at 1065 n.1 for a list of
sources which tend to prove the systematic and widespread violation by the govern-
ment of the wiretapping statute.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1064-65.
115. Id. at 1066.
116. 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972). For a further discussion of Steele, see
notes 178-87 infra and accompanying text.
117. Id. at 1150.
118. Id. at 1151.
119. Id. at 1152.
120. Id. at 1151.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1152.
123. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973).
124. Id. at 621.
125. Id. at 619-20.
126. For further discussion of the defendant's problems in obtaining evidence
from the government, see notes 272-76 infra and accompanying text.
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the burden of establishing a prima facie case, 127 often does not have
available the evidence crucial to his or her defense. Therefore, few
defendants are successful in overcoming the hurdle imposed by the
first element. 128
B. Element 2: "Invidious" or "Bad Faith" Prosecution
Under the Berrios test for discriminatory prosecution, once the
first element has been shown-that others, similarly situated, have been
prosecuted-there still remains the second element. A defendant must
prove that in addition to being singled out, he or she was singled out
for prosecution invidiously or in bad faith. In other words, the de-
fendant must show that the prosecution was based on either an im-
permissible consideration such as race, religion, nationality, or other
arbitrary classification, 129 or the desire to prevent the exercise of con-
stitutional rights. The cases that have been decided under this second
element are voluminous. These cases and the principles that emerge
from them will be examined in the following section.
1. Arbitrary Classification
The only case in which the Supreme Court actually struck down
a prosecution as discriminatory was Yick Wo v. Hopkins.130  The
grounds for that decision were unexceptional by modern standards-
nationality or race could not determine against whom an ordinance
would be enforced. Surprisingly, there have been few subsequent fed-
eral cases in which a prosecution has been so challenged. Although
numerous defendants have alleged that their prosecutions were dis-
criminatory, they have not contended that such prosecutions have been
127. For a further discussion of the defendant's prima facie case, see text
accompanying notes 251-61 infra.
128. For a further discussion of why defendants are usually unsuccessful in
proving the first element of the defense, see text accompanying notes 272-76 infra.
129. The arbitrary classification standard appears roughly analogous to the strict
scrutiny standard of review traditionally employed by the courts in equal protection
challenges. Arbitrary classifications are inherently suspect and to be permissible
must be justified by a compelling state interest. Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214, 216 (1944). It is virtually impossible to find any interest that will justify
the state's imposition of an inherently suspect, arbitrary classification. But see
Korematsu v.' United States, 323 U.S. at 217-18 (upholding constitutionality of
incarceration and dispossession of all persons of Japanese ancestry on West Coast
following bombing of Pearl Harbor) ; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
92 (1943) (upholding West Coast curfew against persons of Japanese origin).
Inherently suspect classifications include race, color, religion, national origin,
nationality, and ancestry. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, and J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 527 (1978). Not included are wealth, San Antonio Inde-
pendent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 25 (1973), and sex, Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
130. For a discussion on Yick Wo, see notes 30-36 supra and accompanying
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based upon classifications; such as race or nationality, which are sus-
pect under the traditional equal protection analysis. It may be intui-
tively obvious to some, and there is certainly supporting documentation
for the belief, that the laws in the United States are applied unequally,
especially with respect to minority citizens.' One would expect that,
given the revitalization of the Yick Wo decision in the late 1960's and
1970's, there would be more cases involving prosecutorial discrimina-
tion based on race or nationality. Federal jurisdiction would exist in
such cases, including those involving local prosecutors, because the
defendant would be asserting a claim under the Federal Constitution,
the denial of equal protection guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. Of course, federal review would be discretionary.
A possible explanation for the dearth of this kind of case may be
that these disputes are typically dealt with in state courts.182 Those
discriminated against on the basis of race or nationality are often people
who simply cannot afford to bring their causes to the federal system.
Usually, their cases will already be in state courts.' In addition,
unless the evidence is overwhelmingly clear, a defense of alleged dis-
criminatory prosecution is unlikely to prevail. As pointed out earlier,
defendants will rarely have the necessary evidence, even when it does
exist, to prove their claims.8 4
Although the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the holding of Yick
Wo, the Court has not reversed any convictions on these grounds.3 5
131. For documentation of the unequal application of laws in this country, see
-generally D. BELL, RACE, RACISM & AMERICAN LAW (1980).
132. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App. 2d 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1960),
in which a defendant's conviction for gambling was reversed and a new trial ordered
so that the defendant could attempt to prove the deliberate and intentional racially
discriminatory enforcement of a law in violation of the equal protection guarantees
of the federal and state constitutions. Id. at 842, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 855-56. At trial
the defendant had unsuccessfully offered to prove that in Pasadena during a three-
year period far more blacks than whites were arrested for gambling; that the police
chief routinely ordered his officers to patrol the black section of town for gambling
while no such action was taken in the white section; and that there were, all through
the period involved, gambling clubs for white men in which no arrests were made.
There was evidence that the police chief knew of the white clubs and was even a
member of one of them. 182 Cal. App. 2d at 839, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
For a discussion of state court cases dealing with the issue of discriminatory
prosecution, see generally Annot., 4 A.L.R. 3d 404-21 (1965).
133. It seems fairly safe to generalize by saying that the state and local prose-
cutors handle most "street crime." On the other hand, federal prosecutors, especially
in recent years, have been focusing on certain types of crime, particularly white
collar crime and political corruption. Thus, one could conclude that minorities are
prosecuted much more frequently by local, rather than by federal, prosecutors. Their
cases would then be heard in state courts.
134. For a discussion of the difficulty for a defendant to obtain evidence of his
or her discriminatory prosecution, see Part IV, infra.
135. In Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905), although the Court reaffirmed
the Yick Wo ruling, it held that the defendant in that case had not sufficiently
proved discriminatory enforcement. The defendant showed that the ordinance under
which he was convicted had only been enforced against Chinese persons. The Court
denied habeas corpus relief to the defendant because there had been no proof that
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In other federal cases defendants have claimed that they have been
discriminated against because of their religious beliefs,"3 6 but such cases
have usually involved the active exercise of first amendment freedoms.
In United States v. Cammisano,17 the defendants, who had been
prosecuted for violating the Meat Inspection Act, 138 alleged selective
prosecution on the basis of their Italian ancestry.' The case was ulti-
mately dismissed because of the government's refusal to turn prosecu-
torial information over to defense counsel, 4 ' which may be viewed as
a small victory in and of itself. The district court, in finding that the
defendants had raised a reasonable doubt about the prosecutor's pur-
pose sufficient to require production of government documents for in
camera inspection, noted the distinction between a prosecutorial classi-
fication based on one's nationality or ancestry and one based on "al-
leged association with 'organized crime.' " ' The court in Cam-
misano noted that while a classification based on the former would be
impermissible unless it furthered some compelling state interest, a
classification on the basis of an alleged association with organized
crime would most likely be permissible as rationally related to valid
law enforcement needs.' 42 Other cases have held that it is not un-
reasonable for a prosecutor to single out for investigation or prosecu-
tion persons suspected of being involved in organized crime ' or
others, besides the Chinese citizens convicted, had violated the ordinance. 198 U.S.
at 759. The Al Sin decision apparently rested on the defendant's failure to suf-
ficiently prove the first element of the discriminatory prosecution defense.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599, 600 (5th Cir. 1977),
where the defendant claimed that he had been singled out for failure to file federal
income tax returns because he had "assert[ed] his First Amendment Religion/
Political Freedoms to be a Protestant or Protestor."
137. 413 F. Supp. 886 (W.D. Mo.), aft'd, 546 F.2d 238 (8th Cir. 1976).
138. 21 U.S.C. §601ff (1972). The Meat Inspection Act is generally concerned
with preventing the flow of unwholesome, adulterated or misbranded meat or meat
food products into the stream of interstate commerce.
139. 413 F. Supp. at 890.
140. United States v. Cammisano, 433 F. Supp. 964, 967 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
141. 413 F. Supp. at 891 n.5.
142. Id. For an excellent discussion of the "reasonable classification" doctrine
in selective enforcement, see Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforce-
ment of State Penal Laws, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1115-22 (1961). For a dis-
cussion of prosecutorial classifications under an equal protection analysis, see Givelber,
supra note 10, at 90-96. For a further discussion of prosecutorial classifications,
see note 167 infra.
143. In United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
903 (1970), the court stated:
Here, selection of this defendant for intensive investigation was based on
his suspected role in organized crime .... It cannot be said that that stand-
ard for selection is not rationally related to the purposes of the various
criminal laws for violation of which [the defendant] was being investigated,
including the alien registration laws.
428 F.2d at 271. See also United States v. Scherer, 523 F.2d 371, 377 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976) (defendant must offer evidence that he was
singled out for investigation, or that government's surveillance had impermissible
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racketeering.1 44
.Prosecution for violation of the tax laws is a fertile area for claims
of selective enforcement. Although many of these challenges concern
the exercise of protected rights,141 some challenges have centered on
allegedly discriminatory classifications. The Eighth Circuit has un-
equivocally held that it is not unreasonable prosecutorial discretion to
focus on the prosecution of attorneys, accountants and other enrolled
practitioners,1 6 given the "special obligations and responsibilities [of
these professionals] to the tax laws." 141 Similarly, the prosecution of
politically prominent or newsworthy persons is generally not an im-
permissible basis for selection.' 4  Although there may be countervail-
ing first amendment considerations, 49 the publicity surrounding the
prosecution of public figures may enhance law enforcement needs such
as deterrence and equality.'50
Although it is not impermissible for a prosecutor to single out
suspected criminals, public figures, or tax professionals, a prosecutorial
classification according to whether a person is an employee of the
government may be impermissible. In United States v. Robinson,'5 '
a private detective was convicted for a clearly illegal wiretap.152  The
defendant asserted a defense of discriminatory prosecution, alleging
that government officials had been extensively violating the wiretapping
statutes, but had never been prosecuted. 5 Finding that government
officials engaging in illegal wiretapping were similarly situated to the
prosecutorial purpose). The legendary case in this context is former Attorney
General Robert Kennedy's allegedly relentless prosecution of suspected mobster
Jimmy Hoffa. S. ZAGRi, FiRE PRESS, FAio TRIAL 3-4 (1966).
144. United States v. Manno, 118 F. Supp. 511, 515 (D.C. Ill. 1954) (fact that
"racketeers" were singled out for prosecution for tax violations held not to constitute
unconstitutional discrimination).
145. For an analysis of the tax protestor cases, see notes 212-17 infra and accom-
panying text.
146. United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205, 1208 (8th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir. 1974).
147. United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1208.
148. United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 943-45 (8th Cir. 1976) (prosecution
of politically prominent person held not impermissible) ; United Statse v. Peskin,
527 F.2d 71, 86 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818 (1976) (same).
149. For a discussion of cases involving an impermissible interference with the
exercise of first amendment rights, see text accompanying notes 169-214 infra.
150. The deterrent value of prosecuting prominent people is clear. The con-
sideration of equality before the law generally concerns prosecutions of public offi-
cials and non-controversial public figures.
151. 311 F. Supp. 1063 (W.D. Mo. 1969). For a further discussion of the
Robinson case, see text accompanying notes 106-14 supra.
152. 311 F. Supp. at 1063. The defendant had wiretapped the telephone of a
client's unfaithful wife.
153. Id. at 1064. The court explained that defense counsel had attempted, but
had not been permitted, to submit the defense of unconstitutional systematic dis-
crimination against private persons in the enforcement of the wiretap statutes. The
question had been reserved as a ground for a motion for judgment of acquittal. Id.
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private defendant who engaged in illegal wiretapping, 54 the court
could discern "no reasonable basis for systematic discriminatory en-
forcement." 155 The court concluded that the application of the wiretap
statutes to the defendant "represented a systematic, fixed, and con-
tinuous policy of unjust discrimination in their enforcement in viola-
tion of the Fifth Amendment." 15
The result in Robinson is somewhat surprising. Even though
the discrimination was found to be systematic, one would not expect
that the classification-governmental versus nongovernmental employee
-would be deemed unreasonable. Under a traditional equal protection
analysis, it seems unlikely that this classification would be struck
down.16 7  That is not to say that the classification in Robinson should
have been upheld. The point is merely that it is surprising that the
court did not find the classification reasonable for law enforcement
purposes.
A few years later, the court in United States v. Perkins 168 re-
jected a claim of discriminatory prosecution based upon the same
governmental/nongovernmental distinction. In Perkins, the court dis-
tinguished Robinson on the basis of the enactment of the Omnibus
Crime Control Act of 1968, which amended the wiretap law applicable
in Robinson. 59 However, the court indicated that apart from the statu-
154. 311 F. Supp. at 1065. The court stated at 1064-65:
Much documentary evidence has been adduced by defendant on his motion
for acquittal or for new trial to show that, during this time, and before and
after, the Government itself, while it was not explicitly exempt from the
operation of the statute, engaged in its systematic violation .... [T]hrough
the time in question here, the agencies of the federal government did in fact
engage in extensive wiretapping activities in violation of . . . the statutes
under which the defendant in the case at bar has been charged. These
activities have continued right up to the time of the alleged offense in the
case at bar. . . . The abundance of . . . materials which tend to prove the
systematic violation of the wiretapping statute is great. The necessary con-
clusion from this evidence is that there has been systematic discrimination
in the enforcement of the act against the defendant in this case, which
renders the prosecution invalid.
155. Id. at 1065-66.
156. Id. at 1066.
157. Id.
158. It should be noted that the emphasis in cases of illegal governmental sur-
veillance of wiretapping has been on the exclusionary rule. The interests of innocent
persons wiretapped or placed under surveillance have not received much attention.
However, it appears that a distinction for law enforcement purposes between govern-
mental and nongovernmental offenders would probably be considered reasonable. For
a discussion of a case which considered this distinction reasonable, see notes 159-60
infra and accompanying text.
159. The court noted that Robinson involved a prosecution arising before the
Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §2511 (1976 and Supp. III 1979),
which gave the government limited eavesdropping powers, 383 F. Supp. at 928. In
Perkins, the defendant's allusions to the spectre of Watergate and other govern-
mental malfeasances was insufficient to invalidate his prosecution. It should be
noted that in Robinson the applicable wiretapping law was 18 U.S.C. §2 (1964) and
the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§501, 605 (1976).
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tory distinctions, the type of prosecutorial discretion alleged was not un-
lawful.160  The Perkins court apparently would allow a prosecutorial
policy that made a distinction based on one's employment with the
government. Given the general judicial reluctance to examine prose-
cutorial discretion or to strike down prosecutions,' 6 ' Perkins would
appear to be the prevailing approach.
A showing of general laxity in enforcement or a showing that
few, if any, have been prosecuted for violating a particular statute or
committing a particular crime, without more, will not support a dis-
criminatory prosecution defense. 62  This principle stems from the
Supreme Court's pronouncement in Oyler v. Boles that mere selectivity
in enforcement is not unlawful.'6 Unless the defendant makes some
allegation that he or she has been prosecuted under an arbitrary prose-
cutorial classification, the claim of discriminatory prosecution will be
summarily rejected.'64 Additionally, creating a new or unusual classi-
fication and claiming to have been prosecuted on that basis will most
likely not meet with success. 165
The general rule discernible from the cases appears to be that in
order for a defendant to prevail on a challenge to a prosecution, he or
160. 383 F. Supp. at 928.
161. See notes 1-17 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the general
deference given to prosecutorial discretion.
162. The following cases stand for the proposition that any degree of nonenforce-
ment of a law, without more, will not invalidate a prosecution; United States v.
Douglass, 579 F.2d 545, 550 (9th Cir. 1978) ; United States v. Mann, 517 F.2d 259,
271 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976) ; United States v. Brook-
shire, 514 F.2d 786, 788-89 (10th Cir. 1975) ; United States v. Ortega-Alvarez, 506
F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975) ; United States v.
Raven, 500 F.2d 728, 733 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975) ; United
States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 220 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972);
United States v. Stagman, 446 F.2d 489, 494 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v.
'Gebhart, 441 F.2d 1261, 1265 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 855 (1971) ; Wash-
ington v. United States, 401 F.2d 915, 924 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Moss v. Hornig, 314
F.2d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 1963); United States v. Rickenbacker, 309 F.2d 462, 464 (2d
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 962 (1963) ; Grell v. United States, 112 F.2d 861,
875 (8th Cir. 1940); Saunders v. Lowry, 58 F.2d 158, 159 (5th Cir. 1932); United
States v. Maplewood Poultry, 320 F. Supp. 1395, 1396 (D. Me. 1970) ; Strasser v.
Doorley, 309 F. Supp. 716, 727-28 (D.R.I. 1970); United States v. Palermo, 152
F. Supp. 825, 828 (E.D. Pa. 1957); Buxbom v. City of Riverside, 29 F. Supp. 3,
8-9 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
163. For discussion of Oyler v. Boles, see text accompanying notes 59-66 supra.
164. United States v. Wallace, 578 F.2d 735, 741 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 898 (1978); Shock v. Tester, 405 F.2d 852, 856-57 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 1020 (1969); United States v. Yingling, 368 F. Supp. 379, 382-84 (W.D.
Pa. 1973).
165. See United States v. Arias, 575 F.2d 253 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
868 (1978) (defendants who choose to testify being submitted to charges of perjury) ;
United States v. Strutton, 494 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1974) (prosecution of pathetic
individuals). See also United States v. Alarik, 439 F.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1971), in
which a defendant convicted of refusing to register for the draft challenged his
prosecution because adult counselors and abettors of draft evasion had not been
prosecuted. The court rejected the defendant's charge of discriminatory treatment
between those under 26 and amenable to the draft and those over 26 and not amenable
to the draft. Id. at 1350.
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she must show not only that others similarly situated have not been
prosecuted, but also that the classification of those prosecuted and those
not prosecuted is an impermissible one. Impermissible classifications
are those enumerated in the traditional equal protection analysis, in-
cluding race, religion and nationality.166 Any other classification must
be shown to be unreasonable; 167 and, given the judicial reluctance to
examine or question the decision to prosecute, such a requirement will
be virtually impossible to meet. Robinson is the only case to date in
which a court struck down a prosecution on the basis of a classification
which, although not inherently suspect, was unreasonable. A more
successful approach to showing an invidious or bad faith prosecution
has been with prosecutorial attempts to stifle the exercise of constitu-
tional rights.
2. Preventing the Exercise of Constitutional Rights
Although Yick Wo v. Hopkins struck down as discriminatory a
prosecution on the basis of enforcement directed only against Chinese
citizens, the Yick Wo holding has been significantly expanded and
applied in the context of prosecutions aimed at preventing the exercise
of constitutional rights. As early as 1968, Chief Judge Bazelon of the
District of Columbia Circuit stated:
166. For a further analysis of prosecutorial classifications, see note 129 supra.
Compare the impermissible considerations determined judicially with those suggested
by the United States Department of Justice:
In determining whether to commence or recommend prosecution or take
other action, the attorney for the government should not be influenced by:
(a) the person's race; religion; sex; national origin; or political associa-
tion, activities, or beliefs;
(b) his own personal feelings concerning the person, the person's associates,
or the victim; or
(c) the possible effect of his decision on his professional personal circum-
stances.
Principles, supra note 20, at 14. While subsection (a) above appears to generally
reflect the present state of the law, subsection (b) goes well beyond the law. See
United States v. Bourque, 541 F.2d 290 (1st Cir. 1976) (defendant failed to show
that others similarly situated were not normally prosecuted for offenses with which
he was charged; therefore court rejected defendant's claim that prosecution was
invalid because charges brought by prosecutor were based on personal vindictiveness).
167. A few commentators have noted the distinction between suspect and non-
suspect criteria in law enforcement administration. Amsterdam, The One-Sided
Sword: Selective Prosecution in Federal Courts, 6 RUT.- AM. L. REv. 1, 22 (1974),
noted the traditional compelling interest/rational basis distinction. In Note, The
Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 COLuM. L. REv.
1103, 1115-18 (1973), the idea of the "reasonable classification" doctrine in selective
enforcement was developed. The question would be whether the legislature could
have reasonably made the classification made by the prosecutor. Finally, in Com-
ment, Deense Access to Evidence of Discriminatory Prosecution, 1974 U. ILL. L.F.
648, 651, the author argued that an "arbitrary criterion" is defined as "a basis for
selection that is not rationally related to the purposes of the criminal law under
which the defendant is charged." (footnote omitted). The author maintained that
any arbitrary criterion constitutes an unjustifiable standard. Id. He found two
especially suspect standards to be race or religion, and a standard based on the
defendant's exercise of a constitutional right. Id. at 652.
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The Government may not prosecute for the purpose of deter-
ring people from exercising their right to protest official mis-
conduct and petition for redress of grievances. Moreover, a
prosecution under such circumstances would be barred by the
equal protection clause, since the Government employs an
impermissible classification when it punishes those who com-
plain against police misconduct and excuses those who do
not.1
68
In 1972 and 1973 three circuit court cases reached the issue of
bad faith prosecutions in the context of preventing the exercise of con-
stitutional rights. These cases specifically held a prosecutorial desire
to stifle the exercise of constitutional rights to be an invidious or bad
faith prosecution, and warrant a more detailed examination.
In United States v. Crowthers,8 9 the defendants appealed con-
victions for violations of government regulations occurring during
several "Masses for peace" in the Pentagon public concourse in
November, 1969 and June, 1970.170 The Fourth Circuit reversed the
convictions because the evidence showed that prior to these particular
masses, the authorities had authorized numerous other meetings, band
recitals, and masses, some of which probably exceeded the level of noise
and obstruction attributed to the defendants.' 7 ' There was also un-
controverted evidence that the authorities had approved of the prior
meetings on the concourse,1 72 but had disapproved of the defendants'
masses for peace.1
7 3
The court found that the government could not, on the one hand,
permit an Episcopal prayer service for the health of the President and
168. Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The
actual holding in Dixon was that the judgments of the lower court be vacated and
traffic violation charges dismissed with prejudice in a case involving an alleged
retaliatory prosecution, where the government expressed no objection to such a dis-
missal. Although Chief Judge Bazelon addressed the equal protection issue, the two
other judges concurred in the result only. Id. at 971.
169. 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
170. Id. at 1076-77. The General Services Administration regulations under
which the defendants were arrested were 41 C.F.R. § 101-19.304 Disturbances, which
prohibited disorderly conduct on public property, and 41 C.F.R. § 101-19.307a Dis-
tribution of handbills, which prohibited the distribution of handbills on public property
without the prior approval of an authorized official.
171. 456 F.2d at 1078-79.
172. For example, there had been previously approved an Episcopal prayer serv-
ice for the health of then-President Nixon at which service there had been 450
persons, far more than there had been at any of the meetings in question. Id. at
1078-79.
173. The government alleged that prior meetings had all been religious in nature,
while the meetings in which the defendants had been involved were, in reality,
"political activity". Even accepting the government's characterization, the court
held that the government could not permit those meetings of which it disapproved.
Id. at 1079. For an elaboration of the court's point, see notes 174-77 infra and
accompanying text.
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in support of the Armed Forces, and, on the other hand, prosecute a
Quaker or Episcopal prayer service to end all war or the Vietnam
War.174 The court also noted that the government could not bring a
prosecution so as to deny the right of the people to peacefully assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances-even those relat-
ing to foreign policy.' 75  Based on these principles, the court concluded
that "[the government] may not permit public meetings in support of
government policy and at the same time forbid public meetings that are
opposed to that policy." 17 Citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins and Boiling v.
Sharpe, the court concluded:
"For officials of the United States government to selectively
and discriminatorily enforce [a regulation] so as to turn it
into a scheme whereby activities protected by the First
Amendment are allowed or prohibited in the uncontrolled dis-
cretion of these officials violates the defendants' right to equal
protection of the laws . .. ,, 177
Not long after the Crowthers decision, the Ninth Circuit decided
United States v. Steele.178  Steele focused upon the appeal of a defend-
ant convicted of violating a statute which punished the refusal to answer
questions on a census form.17 9  The defendant introduced evidence
that the only four people in Hawaii chosen for prosecution for viola-
tion of the statute had participated in a census resistance movement,
publicizing a dissident view that the census is an unconstitutional in-
vasion of privacy and urging the public to avoid compliance with census
requirements.s The defendant also alleged that there were other
174. 456 F2d at 1079.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1080. The extension of the reasoning of Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965), to Crowthers is apparent. In Cox, the Court noted the severe danger
of the guarantee of equal protection in a discretionary licensing scheme under which
parades or meetings were allowed only with the prior permission of an official. Id.
at 557. The Court stated:
It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine which
expressions of view will be permitted and which will not or to engage in
invidious discrimination among persons or groups either by use of a statute
providing a system of broad discretionary licensing power or, as in this
case, the equivalent of such a system by selective enforcement of an ex-
tremely broad prohibitory statute.
1d. at 557-58.
178. 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972). For a further discussion of Steele, see text
accompanying notes 116-21, supra. Id. at 557-58. See also Niemotko v. Maryland
and Fowler v. R.I., discussed supra at note 37.
179. 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972). For further discussion of Steele, see text
accompanying notes 116-21 supra.
180. 461 F.2d at 1150-51. Specifically, the court noted that there was evidencethat : Steele h~ld a press conference, led a protest march, and distributed
pamphlets entitled "Big Brother is Snooping." David Watamull was the
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people who had not completed the census forms but who had escaped
prosecution. The government refused the defendant's request for in-
formation concerning how many others had not completed the forms.
However, Steele was able to bring to the court's attention six other
people who had completely refused on principle to complete the census
forms; these six had not taken a public stand against the census and
none of them were prosecuted.18" '
At trial, the Regional Technician for the'census in Hawaii de-
scribed the four persons prosecuted as "hard core resisters." 182 He
testified that he had ordered his staff to compile special background
dossiers on the four, a discretionary procedure not followed with any
other offenders. He also testified that his organization had been very
concerned about the census resistance movement.
The Ninth Circuit indicated that in cases of alleged discriminatory
prosecution, the defendant "must prove that the selection was deliber-
ately based on an unjustifiable standard, such as race, religion, or other
arbitrary classification." 183 The court stated that Steele would be
entitled to an acquittal if he could prove "that the authorities purpose-
fully discriminated against those who chose to exercise their First
Amendment rights." 184 Noting that the government's operating pro-
cedures would have identified all persons who did not comply, and
further noting that at least six other non-vocal persons in violation of
the statute had been identified by Steele, the court concluded that the
enforcement procedure clearly focused on the "vocal offender." '"
Such a procedure was "inherently suspect, since it [was] Vulnerable to
the charge that those chosen for prosecution [were] being punished
for their expression of ideas, a constitutionally protected right." 18'
Steele's evidence created a strong inference of discriminatory prose-
cution which the government was required to explain or justify. Since
the government offered no explanation for its selection of defendants
other than prosecutorial discretion, the court concluded that Steele had
demonstrated purposeful discrimination by census authorities against
owner of radio station KTRG, which broadcast editorials on the census.
Census authorities had complained to the Federal Communications Commis-
sion about them because they "were calculated to incite people to subvert
the law." Donald Dickinson spoke against the census as an announcer on
station KTRG. William Danks headed the state chapter of a group called
Census Resistance '70; he distributed pamphlets and publicly criticized the
census.
Id. at 1151.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1152.
186. Id.
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those who had publicly expressed their opinions about the census.
Steele's conviction was therefore reversed.
18 7
The last case in the trilogy is United States v. Falk,' in which a
defendant appealed his conviction for failing to possess a selective
service registration card and a draft classification card. Although his
conviction was at first affirmed, 8 9 in a rehearing en banc, the court of
appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the cause so that the
defendant could have a hearing on his charge of discriminatory prose-
cution. The court's discussion of the case is noteworthy, particularly
in light of its thorough analysis of the problem of discriminatory
prosecution.
The court first discussed the holding of Yick Wo and its "un-
deniable application . . . to discriminatory prosecutions." '90 It then
identified two questions that appeared to be troubling the courts which
had dealt with the problem. The first source of disagreement was the
effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Oyler v. Boles; 191 specifically
the Oyler court's statement that "the conscious exercise of some
selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional vio-
lation." "2 The Falk court distinguished Oyler as a case where no
intentional or purposeful discrimination had been alleged. It pointed
out that Oyler did not preclude the granting of relief for intentional
or purposeful discrimination against an individual. 193  In Falk, inten-
tional discrimination had been alleged. Falk claimed that he had been
singled out for selective and discriminatory treatment not because he
had violated the statute, but because the government wished to punish
him for and stifle his participation in the anti-draft movement. The
court pointed out that Falk's expression of his views on Vietnam was
protected by the first amendment.1 4  Analogizing to the constitutional
prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race or religion, the court
187. Id. See also United States v. Danks, 357 F. Supp. 193 (D. Hawaii 1973).
Danks was one of the four individuals named in Steele. His conviction was ac-
cordingly reversed. Id. at 195-96.
188. 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc), rez'g 472 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.
1972). For critiques of the Falk decision see Case Comment, Curbing the Prosecu-
to's Discretion: United States v. Falk, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 372 (1974);
Note, The Ramifications of United States v. Falk on Equal Protection From
Prosecutorial Discrimination, 65 J. CRIM. L. AND CRIMINOLOGY 62 (1974); Note,
United States v. Falk: Developments in the Defense of Discriminatory Prosecution,
72 MIcH. L. Rav. 1113 (1974); Note, Discriminatory Enforcement of Federal
Laws-United States v. Falk, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 942 (1973).
189. United States v. Falk, 472 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1972).
190. 479 F.2d at 619.
191. 368 U.S. 448 (1962). For a further discussion of Oyler v. Boles, see
notes 60-67 supra and accompanying text.
192. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. at 456.
193. 479 F.2d at 619 (citing Moss v. Horning, 314 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1963)).
194. 479 F.2d at 620.
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condemned "discrimination on the basis of the exercise of protected
First Amendment activities, whether done as an individual or, as in
this case, as a member of a group unpopular with the government." 195
The second source of disagreement concerned the problem of proof.
The court, responding to fears that prosecutors would be forever testi-
fying about their motives in seeking an indictment,98 maintained that
the presumption is always that a prosecution is undertaken in good
faith and in a nondiscriminatory fashion. 197  "However, when a de-
fendant alleges intentional purposeful discrimination and presents facts
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the prosecutor's purpose,"
the burden of proving nondiscriminatory enforcement of the law is
shifted to the government. 9  The Seventh Circuit noted the circum-
stances of the case which raised a reasonable doubt about the purposes
of the prosecution. Falk had twice '9 attempted to present evidence
that the government was aware of over 25,000 violations of the
Selective Service laws, similar to the violations committed by the de-
fendant, and that the government had a written policy of nonenforce-
ment.200  At the close of the government's case, Falk's attorney at-
tempted to make an offer of proof which included a statement by the
Assistant United States Attorney that the defendant's draft-counseling
activity was one of the reasons why the prosecution was brought.2"'
Although the trial court refused the offer, the Assistant United States
Attorney made an unsolicited reply in which he noted that the indict-
ment against Falk was approved not only by him, but also by the Chief
of the Criminal Division of the United States' Attorney's Office, the
First Assistant United States Attorney, the United States Attorney
and the Department of Justice in Washington.0 2
The court of appeals also pointed out that there had been a three-
year delay in bringing the indictments against Falk,2°3 that Falk faced a
seemingly excessive punishment of three years imprisonment and that
he had been unjustly denied classification as a conscientious objector.
The court further noted that had Falk originally received the classifi-
195. Id.
196. Id. The court stated that "the prospect of government prosecutors being
called to the stand by every criminal defendant for cross-examination as to their
motives in seeking an indictment is to be avoided." Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 620-21.
199. Falk unsuccessfully had made a pretrial motion to dismiss and offered proof
with his motion for acquittal at the close of the government's case.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 622. It should be noted that the court attached great importance
to the Assistant United States Attorney's unsolicited reply.
203. Id.
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cation to which he was entitled, he would not have had to refuse in-
duction in order to assert his valid claim.2°4 The combination of all
these factors made out at least a prima facie case of improper discrimi-
nation in enforcing the law.208
The case was remanded for a hearing at which Falk could question
the Assistant United States Attorney as to the content of his previous
statements to defense counsel and could present additional evidence on
the issue of other alleged violators and the government's lack of gen-
eral enforcement. The court reiterated its holding that the defendant
had already presented a prima facie case and that the burden of going
forward with proof of nondiscrimination rested on the government. 206
Following the Crowthers-Steele-Falk trilogy, there has been a
plethora of cases in which defendants have asserted that their prose-
cutions were invalid because they were intended to prevent the exercise
of constitutional rights. In United States v. Danks,20 7 the court re-
versed the conviction of the defendant Danks, one of the four invidi-
ously-prosecuted individuals referred to by the Ninth Circuit in the
Steele case.208 In United States v. Berrios,0 9 the Second Circuit re-
luctantly affirmed 210 a lower court holding that the prosecutor had to
turn his files concerning the defendant's prosecution over to the court
for in camera inspection. The defendant contended that he had been
singled out for prosecution because he was one of the few Teamsters
officials who had outspokenly supported Senator McGovern rather than
Richard Nixon in 1972, and because he had spearheaded an effort to
204. Id. at 622-23. The court noted the government's policy of not prosecuting
those who ultimately submit to its will. Id. at 623.
205. Id. The court concluded:
[T]he combination in this case of the published government policy not to
prosecute violators of the card possession regulations, Falk's status as an
active and vocal dissenter to United States policy with regard to the draft
and the Vietnam War, the Assistant United States Attorney's statement
that officials ranging from an Assistant Attorney to the Department of Jus-
tice in Washington participated in the decision to prosecute Falk, the un-
timely delay in bringing the indictment and the government's stated policy
to prosecute only those who refuse induction while absolving those who
submit to the will of the authorities, lead us to conclude that the district
court erred in refusing a hearing on the offer of proof. The unrebutted
evidence before the court, including the admission of the Assistant United
States Attorney and the two published statements by the Selective Service
officials which contradict the propriety of the action taken in this case, made
out at least a prima facie case of improper discrimination in enforcing the
law.
206. Id. at 623-24.
207. 357 F. Supp. 193 (D. Hawaii 1973).
208. Id. at 196. Danks headed the state chapter of a group called Census Re-
sistance '70; he distributed anti-census pamphlets and publicly criticized the census.
United States v. Steele, 461 F2d at 1151.
209. 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
210. The court commented on "the apparent weakness of Berrios' claim ... 
Id. at 1212.
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unionize the Marriott Restaurant chain, an enterprise apparently closely
connected with the Nixon family.21'
Danks and Berrios were decided in 1973 and 1974, respectively.
The Danks court had no choice under Steele but to reverse the de-
fendant's conviction. The Berrios court merely affirmed a lower court's
ruling for in camera disclosure of the prosecutor's files. However, the
defendants in the numerous cases which followed the Crowthers-Steele-
Falk line were all unsuccessful. An examination of those cases, and
why the challenges failed, follows.
After the Crowthers, Steele and Falk trilogy, the typical case was
a challenge to prosecution for violation of the income tax laws. For
the most part these challenges were made by vocal or active tax pro-
testors who had been prosecuted for failure to file returns or pay taxes,
or for supplying false or fraudulent statements. 1 These defendants
alleged that they had been unlawfully prosecuted for exercising their
first amendment rights. All of these challenges failed.213  However,
there is a major distinction between these cases and Steele or Folk.
In Steele and Falk the defendants were being prosecuted solely for
their protests or outspokenness against official policy. Although Steele
and Falk stand for the proposition that people cannot be prosecuted
by the government simply as a means to prevent the exercise of their
211. Id. at 1209. The court explained:
In support of his charge of selective prosecution, Berrios submitted the
affidavit of his counsel Martin Garbus, Esq., which states that he and his
client "believe" that (1) there have been only three prosecutions under
§ 504 since 1969; (2) Mr. Marriott has been a close friend of the President
and a substantial contributor to his political campaign; (3) Donald Nixon,
the President's brother is a vice-president of Marriott; (4) Herbert
Kalmbach, attorney for Marriott, was also the President's personal attor-
ney; (5) Charles Colson, formerly counsel to the President and later coun-
sel to the Teamsters Union was a "prime mover in the prosecution," and
(6) there are hundreds of unions with officers who have prison records.
Id. at 1209-10 (footnotes omitted).
Another case in which the question of political activity was addressed was
United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 941
(1979). Although the defendant, who alleged discriminatory enforcement as be-
tween members of the Democratic and Republican party, was unable to make a suffi-
cient prima facie showing, the court noted that "membership in a political party is
protected by the first amendment, and the mere exercise of that right cannot
be punished by means of selective prosecution." 602 F.2d at 569 n.9. For a discus-
sion of defendant's prima facie showing, see note 102 supra.
212. The defendants in these cases were typically prosecuted under 26 U.S.C.
§§7203 and 7205 (1954).
213. United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 569 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1071 (1980) ; United States v. Stout, 601 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 979 (1979) ; United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Kahl, 583 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1978) ; United States v. Johnson,
577 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Gardiner, 531 F.2d 953 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976). For a dis-
cussion of why these tax challenge cases failed, see notes 214-19 infra and accom-
panying text.
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first amendment rights, these cases do not hold that the exercise of first
amendment rights will shield people from punishment for commission
of crimes. According to Steele and Falk, if the government is not
enforcing a law, and one speaks out against that law, or against govern-
ment policy, he or she may not be punished. However, if a law is
regularly enforced, then protest of that law will not prevent the govern-
ment from prosecuting violators.
In the context of the tax cases, the courts responded to defendants'
challenges to their prosecutions by reaffirming the principle that the
prosecution of the most flagrant violators of the law is permissible in
furtherance of the government's legitimate interest in deterrence.21 4
Prosecution of the most vocal and publicized protestors, who concomi-
tantly break the law, simply serves to ensure more general compliance
with that law. 215  Most importantly, in enforcing the tax laws, the
government was able to show that it was not singling out only the
protestors-pointing to its policy of regularly prosecuting all known
violators.21 Active protestors were simply the more readily visible
offenders.217  The courts all agreed that prosecution of vocal offenders,
as well as all other known offenders, was not invidious or bad faith
prosecution.
From these cases it becomes clear that the prosecution of a flagrant
violator of the law is not, by itself, unlawful. In fact, an earlier opinion
in the Falk case had, under that principle, upheld the defendant's
prosecution.21 8 However, although it is a legitimate enforcement tech-
nique to prosecute the notorious violator, this is only legitimate as long
as all known violators are also prosecuted. As one court recently
stated, "Aggressively displaying one's antipathy to the . . . system or
daring the government to enforce [a law] does not create immunity
from, or a defense to, prosecution." 211
214. For a further discussion of prosecution of flagrant violators of the law,
see notes 218-19 infra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Gardiner,
531 F.2d 953, 954 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 853 (1976) (citing United States
v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976)).
215. United States v. Moss, 604 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1979) ; United States v.
Stout, 601 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979) ; United States
v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 1978) ; United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d
1304, 1309 (5th Cir. 1978) ; United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 944-45 (8th Cir.
1976); United States v. Oakes, 527 F.2d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 1975).
216. See, e.g., United States v. Stout, 601 F.2d at 328; United States v. Kahl,
583 F.2d 1351, 1354 (5th Cir. 1978).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 868.
218. United States v. Falk, 472 F.2d 1101, 1107, rev'd, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir.
1972).
219. United States v. Heilman, 614 F.2d 1133, 1139 (7th Cir. 1980) (citing
United States v. Stout, 601 F.2d at 328).
[Vol. 55
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
It is also clear that the exercise of first amendment rights will
not shield an individual from prosecution for a serious offense.220
Some commentators have noted a distinction in judicial treatment of
the selective prosecution defense based on "malum prohibitum" and
"malum in se. " 221 Although it is somewhat unusual for a defendant
to challenge a prosecution for a serious crime on the grounds that he
or she was selectively prosecuted,22 there have been a few such cases.
These cases are different from the tax, selective service, and census
cases where the defendants allege that they have been prosecuted for
their active protest against the law violated. In prosecutions for more
serious offenses, defendants appear to allege that they have been prose-
cuted for the exercise of first amendment freedoms only, and not for
alleged commissions of crimes. As can be expected, courts are not
receptive to such challenges.22 When a defendant is charged with a
serious crime, the courts are hesitant to allow or be persuaded by evi-
dence that his or her prosecution stems from an impermissible purpose.
Yet judicial review of unequal enforcement of the laws should not de-
pend on the type of crime committed.
An interesting case in this context is United States v. Berrigan.
224
The defendants, convicted of smuggling letters into and out of a prison,
220. Serious offense in this context refers to a crime not merely regulatory in
nature--i.e., a crime of violence or a crime where property is lost, destroyed or
stolen.
221. See Note, The Ramifications of United States v. Falk on Equal Protection
From Prosecutorial Discrimination, supra note 188, at 63. The author notes, how-
ever, that the distinction between malum prohibitum and malum in se should be
rendered invalid by Oyler v. Boles. Id. at 63. A similar point of view is expressed
in Comment, Curbing the Prosecutor's Discretion; United States v. Falk, 9 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 372, 381 n.58 (1974), where the author argues that such a dis-
tinction is groundless, since discriminatory prosecution in either case constitutes
unequal and unconstitutional treatment. But see Note, Discriminatory Enforcement
of Federal Laws-United States v. Falk, supra note 188, at 948 (adoption of Falk
approach will hinder enforcement of any law if proscribed action is malum
prohibitum).
222. It seems fairly obvious that serious crimes are routinely prosecuted. Prose-
cutors are under intense pressure to prosecute crimes which "frighten, outrage or
intrigue the public." Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV.
L. REV. 1521, 1526 (1981).
223. United States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182, 1196-97 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977) (defendant, a member of the activist American Indian
movement, indicted for detaining postal inspector and robbing pistol belonging to
United States) ; United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 179-80 (3d Cir. 1973),
aff'g United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (defendants,
radicals and ardent opponents of United States military involvement in Viet Nam,
indicted for conspiring to kidnap Henry Kissinger, destroy underground heating
system of Washington, D.C., engage in "draft board raids", and smuggle various
letters) ; United States v. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64, 77 (D.D.C. 1979) (members
or agents of the Church of Scientology charged as burglars, thieves, perjurers, and
conspirators) ; United States v. Banks, 368 F. Supp. 1245, 1252-53 (W.D.S.D. 1973)
the indictment of defendants, members of the activist Indian movement, arose out of
occupation-seige of Wounded Knee in Spring, 1973).
224. 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973), affg United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp.
912 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
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contended that they were victims of discriminatory prosecution. The
defendants had originally been indicted for conspiracy to kidnap Henry
Kissinger, to send through the mails a letter containing a threat to
kidnap Henry Kissinger, to destroy the underground heating system
in Washington, D.C., to interfere with the Selective Service system
by engaging in "draft board raids," and to smuggle or attempt to
smuggle letters into and out of a federal prison.2 5 A jury convicted
the defendants only of the charge of smuggling letters.2
The defendants alleged that their prosecutions had been based on
their anti-war activity.2 2 7 To that effect, defendants offered evidence
of Federal Bureau of Investigation surveillance of them and statements
made by former F.B.I. director Hoover about them.228  Despite the
evidence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed with the
lower court that adequate showing of discriminatory prosecution had
not been made.229 Looking at the entire prosecution, the court con-
cluded that "[w]hen all the circumstances of this prosecution are con-
sidered, the prosecution under § 1791 was a justifiable aspect of the
entire prosecution, viz., the conspiracy, the overt acts, and the violation
of § 1791." 280 The court was apparently swayed by the alleged con-
spiracy for which the defendants were prosecuted.23 ' Although the
jury did not find them guilty of that plot, the court was unwilling to
seriously consider the defendant's contentions concerning the prosecu-
tions for smuggling letters.
232
Generally, after the Crowthers-Steele-Falk line of cases, courts
have been extremely reluctant even to consider challenges to a prose-
cution on the ground that it was intended to prevent the defendant's
exercise of constitutionally protected rights.23  Although the above
225. 482 F.2d at 173.
226. Id. The statute under which defendants were convicted for smuggling
letters out of a federal prison was 18 U.S.C. § 1791 (1969), as augmented by
28 C.F.R. § 6.1 (1973).
227. 482 F.2d at 173. Although one commentator has argued that Berrigan
was a case of "bad faith" rather than "selective" prosecution, Amsterdam, supra
note 167, at 23, the bad faith prosecution has become entwined with selective prose-
cution. In Berrigan, the defendants were arguing that their prosecution was merely
an attempt to prevent the exercise of their first amendment rights. Proof of such
an allegation would clearly constitute discriminatory prosecution, as defined by the
courts.
228. See United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. at 928-29.
229. 482 F.2d at 179-80.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 179.
232. The lower court had pointed out that there had been three previous prose-
cutions under § 1791. United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. at 928. It would seem
to follow that even if the court had seriously considered defendants' claim, the three
prior prosecutions would have served to obviate their claim.
233. See, e.g., United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 54 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 925 (1976) (summary rejection of defendant's claim of discriminatory
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cases concern the exercise of first amendment rights-usually some
form of political protest-a challenged prosecution may also be an
attempt to prevent the exercise of other constitutionally protected
rights. However, it is unknown how these other constitutionally-based
challenges would fare in court.3
It appears that there are few circumstances under which the courts
will strike down a prosecution brought to prevent the exercise of con-
stitutional rights. Although Crowthers, Steele, and Falk are distin-
guishable from other cases in which defendants have unsuccessfully
challenged their prosecutions as intended to stifle their exercise of con-
stitutional rights, the cases nevertheless exude judicial concern for
prosecutorial autonomy.
IV. PRESENTATION OF THE CLAIM OF DISCRIMINATORY PROSECUTION
A. Methods
The prevailing method for challenging a prosecution as invidious
or in bad faith is by a pre-trial motion to dismiss.3 Although this
challenge is generally called the discriminatory prosecution defense,
the challenge is not in a strict sense a defense at all. There have been
a few cases, however, in which a defendant has brought the challenge
as a defense. For example, the Robinson court granted the defendant's
motion for acquittal in reversing his conviction. And in Falk, the
defendant made both a pre-trial motion to dismiss and a motion for
acquittal.23 6  The Falk court did not overturn the defendant's convic-
tion; instead, it vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the
cause for an evidentiary hearing on the discriminatory prosecution
237issue.
In 1961 the Supreme Court indicated that individuals could defend
against any proceeding actually prosecuted on the ground of uncon-
prosecution for resisting prison rectal examination, despite defendant's contentions
that hundreds of others had not been prosecuted for same conduct and that he was
being prosecuted solely for being an active "jailhouse lawyer").
234. Although it is theoretically true that a claim of discriminatory enforcement
can rest on the alleged desire to prevent the exercise of any constitutional right, it
is unclear how this principle is applied in reality. For example, in Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), the Supreme Court held that it was not impermissible
for a prosecutor to bring higher charges after a defendant rejects a proposed plea
bargain, despite the resulting stifling of the defendant's sixth amendment right to a
trial. Id. at 365. The Bordenkircher Court appeared to rest its decision on judicial
solicitude toward the plea bargaining system, id. at 363-64, and was apparently
unconcerned about the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel. To the extent
that Bordenkircher focused upon the plea bargaining system, it may be an aberration
in terms of discriminatory prosecution cases.
235. For a further discussion of the procedure of challenging a prosecution, see
notes 239-44 izfra and accompanying text.
236. 472 F.2d at 1103.
237. 479 F.2d at 624.
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stitutional discrimination.23 However, since the Court has never
actually reached the question, it can hardly be cited for the proposition
that a discriminatory prosecution is actually an affirmative defense.
The circuit court in United States v. Berrigan pointed out that an
unlawfully discriminatory prosecution does not reflect upon the guilt
or innocence of the accused.23 9 Rather, the question concerns a con-
stitutional defect in the initiation of the prosecution.2 0 The question
of discriminatory prosecution is not one for the trier of fact-it is for
the judge.5" It appears to be generally agreed that the question should
be raised as a pre-trial motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.242 Requests for discovery of
governmental information should also be made before trial, under
Rule 12(b) (4) of the Federal Rules.243 Most defendants who chal-
lenge a prosecution as being discriminatory do so as a motion to dis-
miss before trial; if the motion is denied, the question is reserved
for appeal. 5 "
Another method of presenting the claim is by seeking injunctive
relief; however, this procedure appears obsolete and has been described
as inappropriate.245 Injunctive relief has been granted in three cases
in which the court enjoined the discriminatory enforcement of the
statute.246  The last such case was in 1970 247 and it appears unlikely
that the courts will entertain injunctive actions when defendants can
simply and more economically make pre-trial motions to dismiss. 2 48
238. Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 588 (1961);
see also Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 359 (1953).
239. 482 F.2d at 175.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 571 (10th Cir.
1976) ; United States v. Oaks, 508 F.2d 1403, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1974). Rule
12(b) (1), FED. R. CRIM. P., provides that "[a]ny defense, objection, or request
which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be
raided before trial by motion . . . [t]he following must be raised prior to trial:
(1) Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of the prosecu-
tion. .. ." (emphasis added).
243. 482 F.2d at 175. FED. R. CRim. P. 12(b) (4) provides that requests for
discovery pursuant to Rule 16 must be raised prior to trial. Rule 16 concerns
disclosure of evidence by the government and by the defendant.
244. See, e.g., United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205, 1209 (8th Cir. 1975)
United States v. Wiley, 503 F.2d 106, 107 (8th Cir. 1974).
245. Cardinale & Feldman, supra note 15, at 682.
246. See City of Evansville v. Gaseteria, 51 F.2d at 237, discussed supra at text
accompanying notes 40-49; Zayre of Georgia, Inc. v. Atlanta, 276 F. Supp. at 894,
discussed supra at text accompanying notes 75-79;- Zayre of Georgia, Inc. v. City
of Marietta, 416 F.2d at 253, discussed supra at text accompanying notes 80-90.
247. Zayre of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Marietta, discussed at notes 80-90 supra
and accompanying text.
248. There is potential waste of judicial resources for a court to enjoin a prose-
cution which may never take place. Although there may may be a certain stigma
attached to being prosecuted for violation of criminal statute, there does not seem
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Given that the issue of prosecutorial discrimination does not really
turn on the guilt or innocence of the accused, it has been suggested
that defendants not be allowed to raise the issue for the purpose of
striking down the prosecution. Rather, it is urged, the presence of an
improper prosecutorial purpose or motive should effect the sentencing
decision.249 The problem with this approach, however, is that it at-
taches greater importance to punishing the guilty than it does to safe-
guarding constitutional rights and freedoms. The price paid for pro-
tection of constitutional freedoms is that at times a guilty person must
be set free.25 In fact, given that discriminatory enforcement generally
occurs with respect to less serious or regulatory crimes, the price is
quite low.
B. The Prima Facie Case
The cases are in complete agreement that the burden is on the
defendant to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory prosecu-
tion.25' There is always a presumption that a prosecution is under-
taken in good faith,252 and that presumption is generally difficult to
overcome. This section attempts to describe exactly what constitutes
sufficient evidence in order to make out the necessary prima facie
case.255 The two necessary elements are (1) a demonstration that
others similarly situated have not been prosecuted, and (2) substantive
evidence of discrimination.
to be any liberty or property interest guaranteed by the Constitution to prevent
such a prosecution.
249. Cardinale & Feldman, supra note 15, at 692.
250. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-60 (1961) (exclusionary rule for
illegal searches and seizures). In cases of discriminatory prosecution and illegally
obtained evidence, the real issue is the governmental misconduct, and not the guilt
or innocence of the accused. See also Note, The Ramifications of United States v.
Falk on Equal Protection from Prosecutorial Discrimination, supra note 188, at 74.
251. See, e.g., United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1211; United States v. Falk,
479 F.2d at 620-21; United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d at 1151; United States v.
Crowthers, 456 F.2d at 1078. See also United States v. Union Nacional de
Trabajadores, 576 F.2d 388, 395 (1st Cir. 1978) ; United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d
940, 943 (8th Cir. 1976) ; United States v. Crow Dog, 532 F.2d 1182, 1196 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977) ; United States v. Oaks, 527 F.2d 937,
940 (9th Cir. 1975) ; United States v. Scherer, 523 F.2d 371, 377 (7th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976) ; United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 860
(3d Cir. 1973).
252. For cases which evidence the presumption that a prosecution is undertaken
in good faith, see the cases listed in note 251, supra; see also United States v.
Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 569 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 941 (1979); United
States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925 (1976)
United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 571 (10th Cir. 1976).
253. See Cardinale & Feldman, supra note 15, at 676-80, for a comprehensive
discussion of the elements of the prima facie case.
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It is clear that the defendant must, at the appropriate time, 254 put
forward some evidence of discriminatory prosecution. 55 Merely mov-
ing for dismissal on these grounds, however, without introducing some
substantive evidence of discrimination is not sufficient.256 Simply put,
introduction of evidence showing only the first element, that others
similarly situated have not been prosecuted, without evidence of the
second element, substantive evidence of discrimination, will most likely
not establish the prima facie case. 57 Nor is it sufficient simply to
allege and introduce evidence that the prosecution was "invidious" or
"in bad faith" if there is no evidence of the first element.2 58  There
must be evidence of both the first and second elements to sustain the
defendant's burden.
It is enormously difficult for a defendant to establish the prima
facie case because there must be relatively substantial evidence that
others similarly situated have not been prosecuted. 59 Merely produc-
254. The defendant generally moves for dismissal before trial.
255. United States v. Ream, 491 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir. 1974) ; United States
v. Hubbard, 474 F. Supp. 64, 77 (D.D.C. 1979).
256. United States v. Ream, 491 F.2d at 1246.
257. For cases in which the defendant failed to put forward evidence of the
second element of the defense, see United States v. Stout, 601 F.2d 325, 328 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979 (1979) ; United States v. Kahl, 583 F.2d 1351, 1352(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Wallace, 578 F.2d 735, 741 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 898 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1308-09
(5th Cir. 1978) ; United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 86 (7th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Yingling, 368 F. Supp. 379, 384 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
258. For cases in which the defendant did not put forward evidence of the first
element of the defense, see United States v. Heilman, 614 F.2d 1133, 1138-39 (7th
Cir. 1980) ; United States v. Torquato, 602 F.2d 564, 569-70 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 941 (1979) ; United States v. Union Nacional de Trabajadores, 576 F.2d
388, 395 (1st Cir. 1978) ; United States v. Kelly, 556 F.2d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 1977) ;
United States v. Bourque, 541 F.2d 290, 292-93 (1st Cir. 1976) ; United States v.
Scherer, 523 F.2d 371, 377 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976);
United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 860 (3d Cir. 1973) ; United States v.
Dawson, 400 F.2d 194, 204 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Shober, 489 F. Supp.
393, 404-05 (ED. Pa. 1979).
259. See, e.g., United States v. Carson, 434 F. Supp. 806 (D. Conn. 1977), in
which the court held that a prima facie case was made out. The court noted that:
Carson argues that he was specially chosen for prosecution in the instant
case because (1) the person injured is a member of the FBI, and (2) the
government is attempting to cover up the misconduct of one of its agents.
Initially, in support of the motion to dismiss, counsel for the defendant
in a detailed affidavit set forth an offer of proof asserting that numerous
complaints of excessive force and brutality have been made against local
police officers and state troopers in the State of Connecticut; that virtually
all these complaints involved allegations of police misconduct that were more
extreme than in the present case; and that with the exception of two cases,
no federal prosecution was instituted. The affidavit particularized these
general allegations by reference to statistical evidence obtained from the
records of the Connecticut State Police, by specifying the factual circum-
stances of other incidents, and by hearsay reports received from various
attorneys who have represented numerous complainants in so-called "Tolice
brutality" cases. Based on this preliminary showing, the defendant requested
an evidentiary hearing to support his claim of selective and discriminatory
treatment.
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ing evidence that one other person similarly situated was not prose-
cuted will not support a prima facie case.260 The first element appears
to be most satisfactorily proven by statistical evidence. 261  For ex-
ample, in one case a defendant introduced evidence that there were
51,000 tax delinquency investigations in a state during a three year
period; that 4,000 instances of possible criminal tax violations in the
state were brought to the attention of the Internal Revenue Service
Intelligence Division; and that the Division recommended for prose-
cution during that period only 9 failure-to-file cases. -62  There, the
court held that the statistical evidence, along with direct evidence of
the second element-the fact that defendant's case was initiated im-
mediately following his public announcement that he would not comply
with the filing requirements as a means of protest against the Vietnam
war-was sufficient to make out a prima facie case of discriminatory
prosecution.2'"
In United States v. Falk,2M the trial court found that the de-
fendant had not made out a prima facie case. Although the court of
appeals originally affirmed that finding, it reversed in a rehearing en
banc, holding that the defendant had, after all, made out a prima facie
case. The evidence offered in Falk included the fact that the govern-
ment, despite its awareness of over 25,000 violators of the Selective
Service laws and the general policy of nonenforcement, had singled out
the defendant, an active draft protestor, for prosecution.
Although the elements of a prima facie case can be stated with
ease, it is rather difficult to quantify the amount of evidence required.
However, two principles do emerge-that the determination of the
sufficiency of the evidence is made on a case-by-case basis, and that
Since the defendant's moving papers made out at least a prima facie
case of improper discrimination in enforcing the law, an evidentiary hearing
was conducted.
Id. at 807.
260. United States Labor Party v. Oremus, 619 F.2d 683, 691 (7th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Banks, 368 F. Supp. 1245, 1252 (W.D.S.D. 1973).
261. However, statistical evidence alone will generally not be sufficient to support
a prima facie showing. Although it will often satisfy the first element of a dis-
criminatory prosecution claim, it will usually be inadequate to show the second
element. Moreover, statistical evidence, if available, is often the only evidence a
defendant can obtain. See Note, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Prosecution:
The Effect of Announced Screening Policies, 36 LA. L. REV. 1107, 1110 (1976);
S. Krieger, Defense Access to Evidence of Discriminatory Prosecution, 1974 U. ILL.
L.F. 648, 654-56 (1974).
262. United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 1976).
263. Id. at 943. It should be noted that although the defendant did make out
a prima facie case of discriminatory prosecution, he will not prevail upon his claim.
Id. at 945. For another case in which the defendant made out a prima facie case,
see United States v. Carson, 434 F. Supp. at 809-10, discussed supra, at note 259.
264. 472 F.2d 1101, rev'd, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1972) (en banc). For a fur-
ther discussion of Falk, see notes 188-205 supra and accompanying text.
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the defendant's prima facie showing is extremely difficult to make.
One commentator has suggested that a less burdensome requirement
be imposed on the defendant.2
C. The Hearing
Once the defendant has established a prima facie case, he or she
is entitled to a hearing on the issue of discriminatory prosecution.206
The defendant, at that point, is also entitled to discovery of govern-
mental information. 67 However, cases rarely advance to the discovery
stage because of the defendant's initial inability to put forward a prima
facie case without the government's information; second, discovery
may not be granted out of judicial respect for prosecutorial
autonomy.
2 68
265. Givelber, supra note 10, at 112, would hold a prima facie case to be:
(1) evidence that a generally unenforced law has been sporadically enforced against
a very few of the knowable violators; or (2) evidence that a law has been enforced
against only a fraction of the knowable violators, and that fraction is unrepresentative
of the total group of violators with respect to a characteristic which is irrelevant to
law enforcement purposes. Once a prima facie case is made out, Givelber would
have the prosecutor explain the basis for his enforcement decisions, with the court
looking to the reasonableness and accuracy of his explanation and the legitimacy of
his purpose. Id. at 123.
266. United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d at 623-24. See generally Amsterdam,
supra note 167, at 18-23.
267. Falk, 479 F.2d at 623-24. The court directed that in the hearing, the
defendant could question the prosecutor as to the content of his previous statements
to defendant's counsel. Defendant and his counsel alleged that the prosecutor's
statements showed that defendant had been singled out for special prosecution be-
cause of his draft counseling activities. Id. at 619-20.
268. See, e.g., United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 1978) (de-
fendant's motion to discover governmental information denied in the course of court's
upholding government's alleged policy of prosecuting individuals who publicly assert
their refusal to pay taxes) ; United States v. Kahl, 583 F.2d 1351-55 (5th Cir.
1978) (trial court's discretion governs with regard to discovery motions and will
not be overturned unless clear abuse of discretion shown; United States v. Johnson,
577 F.2d 1304, 1309 (5th Cir. 1978) (since defendant failed to make prima facie
showing of discriminatory prosecution, he could not discover governmental in-
formation which he contended would have helped him establish his claim) ; United
States v. Kelly, 556 F.2d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 1977) (district court's reluctance to
question prosecutor's exercise of discretion, without defendant first demonstrating
his claim might have merit, was upheld) ; United States v. Leggett & Platt, Inc.,
542 F.2d 655, 657 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977) (trial court's
dismissal of case for government's failure to produce information vacated and case
remanded for reconsideration of whether documents requested were irrelevant or
privileged) ; United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 54 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 925 (1976) (despite defendant's assertions that hundreds of other prisoners
not prosecuted for same conduct as defendant and that he was being prosecuted for
exercising first amendment rights as active "jailhouse lawyer," court found no error
in denial of discovery motions) ; United States v. Baechler, 509 F.2d 13, 15 (4th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 993 (1975) (in prosecution under Selective Service
Act, where defendant claimed he had been singled out for prosecution, no error in
disallowing defendant's request for selective service records indicating how many
men registered in United States, his state, and for all records of selective service
dealing with nonregistration or potential registrants) ; United States v. Berrigan,
482 F.2d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1973) (defendants, indicted for and convicted of smug-
gling letters into and out of a federal prison, and who alleged discriminatory prose-
cution, could discover neither government files relating to decision to investigate and
seek indictments in their case nor files relating to decisions to prosecute any viola-
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Since the Falk decision, there have been some reported cases in
which hearings on the issue of prosecutorial discrimination were held.
The defendants in these cases nevertheless have been overwhelmingly
unsuccessful."8 9 Although the court in Falk indicated that where the:
defendant raises a reasonable doubt about whether his prosecution was
the result of purposeful discrimination, the burden of going forward
with proof of nondiscrimination would shift to the prosecutor,2 70 the
burden of going forward that the courts have actually placed on the
prosecutor has been minimal. A number of commentators have con-
curred in the idea that the burden of proof should shift to the govern-
tions of statute under which defendants indicted) ; see also United States v. Dawson,
400 F.2d 194, 203 (2d Cir. 1968) (defendant's subpoenas requiring appearance of
IRS agent and production of IRS documents at trial sought information unreason-
ably tangential to essential question or guilt, and thus properly quashed); Dear
Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1962) (court properly
quashed defendant's subpoena seeking INS lists of organizations, which included the
Chinese-American Democratic Youth Club, since decision to prosecute rests with
the United States Attorney, not INS, which is merely an investigating agency).
For a further discussion of the defendant's inability to put forward a sufficient prima
facie case without access to government's information, see notes 273-306 infra and
accompanying text.
269. For example, in United States v. Carson, 434 F. Supp. 806, 809-10 (D.
Conn. 1977), the indictment of a state police officer under the federal civil rights
statute for assaulting a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent was not dismissed
after a hearing on the issue of discriminatory prosecution because the record
showed other indictments under the same statute; there was no evidence that the
government indicted the defendant based on any arbitrary, invidious or unjustifiable
standard such as race, religion, political affiliation or the desire to prevent the exer-
cise of a constitutional right; there were no unusual procedures followed in the
decision-making process to prosecute the defendant, there was no evidence of bad
faith motivation, and the decision to prosecute was based on lawful and responsible
standards. Also, in United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940, 940-45 (8th Cir. 1976), a
defendant who was indicted for income tax violations and who made a prima facie
showing of discriminatory prosecution did not prevail upon his claim because evi-
dence adduced at the hearing showed that the government's selection of the de-
fendant, based on his public refusal to pay taxes, was valid. And in United States
v. Oaks, 527 F.2d 937, 939-940 (9th Cir. 1975), a defendant who was indicted for
income tax violations and who made a prima facie showing of discriminatory prose-
cution did not prevail upon his claim because evidence adduced at the hearing
showed that only one-half of those prosecuted, including defendant, belonged to
defendant's tax rebellion group, and that the government's policy in prosecuting
reflected both the flagrancy of the violation and the potential deterrent value of a
particular case. In United States v. Mirabile, 503 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975), the court upheld the lower court's finding that the
evidence adduced at a hearing on the issue of the alleged selective prosecution of the
defendant, who had been indicted for mail fraud, was insufficient to support the
defendant's claim. And in In re Dellinger, 502 F.2d 813, 817-18 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975), the court confirmed a lower court's denial of
defendant's claim of selective prosecution where defendants, indicted for criminal
contempt at the "Chicago 7" trial, were granted a hearing on the issue of selective
prosecution and the evidence adduced at the hearing showed that the government had
a rational basis for prosecuting the case. Also, in United States v. Maplewood
Poultry, 320 F. Supp. 1395, 1396 (D. Me. 1970). at an evidentiary hearing on the
issue of selective prosecution, evidence which showed that the defendants were the
only two concerns against which the government had initiated criminal prosecutions,
even though there were numerous other industrial sources of pollution of the bay,
did not make out a case of denial of due process or equal protection in the absence
of a showing of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
270. 479 F.2d at 624. See also United States v. Crrowthers, 456 F.2d at 1078.
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ment once the defendant makes a prima facie showing.27x The courts,
however, have consistently rejected this idea. Judicial acceptance of
prosecutorial explanations and recognition of the prosecutor's need
for extreme latitude appear to make it virtually impossible for de-
fendants to prevail on this issue. The conclusion is inescapable that
a defendant will prevail only in the most blatant or egregious case of
discrimination.2 72
D. Problems in Obtaining the Evidence
As demonstrated by the above discussion, a defendant who believes
that he or she has been "singled out" for prosecution will have an
extremely difficult, if not impossible, task in proving prosecutorial
discrimination. The burden of proof is on the defendant, but the evi-
dence necessary to sustain that burden is almost always in the hands
of the government. Although it has been suggested that the prose-
cutor be held more accountable for his or her selection, 273 it is virtually
impossible to obtain evidence showing why a prosecutor brought a
particular case. Often the only evidence a defendant will have is his
or her beliefs. There will be an evidentiary hearing only if the de-
fendant can put forward what has been called a "colorable entitlement"
for proceeding with the inquiry.274 It is only after such initial showing
by the defendant that governmental information may be discoverable,
and often the government will attempt to prevent disclosure.
There are few cases in which a prosecutor has actually testified.2 75
Generally, the court will find that the prima facie showing has not been
271. See Amsterdam, supra note 167, at 14; Givelber, supra note 10, at 106;
Note, The Ramifications of United States v. Falk on Equal Protection From Prose-
cutorial Discrimination, supra note 188, at 70; Note, Developments in the Law-
Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1098-99 (1969).
272. See, e.g., United States v. Steele, 461 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1972), where
the only four persons prosecuted in Hawaii for violating the census laws were four
vocal protestors. Id. at 1150. Since the government had to know of the other
offenders, the court struck down the prosecutions of the four protestors. Id. at
1152. See notes 178-87 supra and accompanying text for a further discussion of
Steele.
273. Vorenberg, supra note 222, at 1560. See also Note, The Right to Non-
discriminatory Prosecution: The Effect of Announced Screening Policies, 36 LA.
L. REv. 1107, 1113 (1976).
274. United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d at 181.
275. In United States v. Mirabile, 503 F.2d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975), the prosecutor gave limited testimony with respect
to the issue of his selection of the defendant for prosecution. The United States
Attorney in In re Dellinger, 502 F.2d 813, 817 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
990 (1975), gave more than 50 pages of testimony concerning his basis for prose-
cuting the defendant. The court of appeals in United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d at
623, ordered on remand that the defendant could examine the prosecutor at a hearing
on the issue of selective prosecution. In other cases, there has been government
testimony by someone other than the prosecutor. See, e.g., United States v. Steele,
461 F.2d at 1151-52 (Regional Technical for census in Hawaii); United States v.
Carson, 434 F. Supp. 806, 808 (Deputy Chief of Civil Rights Division of Depart-
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met and therefore, governmental or prosecutorial information will not
be discoverable.276  However, there have been two cases in which
courts have, upon a claim of discriminatory prosecution but without a
prima facie showing by the defendant, ordered the production of
government documents for in camera inspection and subsequent dis-
closure of relevant portions to defense counsel.
In United States v. Berrios,2 77 the government appealed the dis-
trict court's dismissal of indictments against the defendants after one
defendant, Pablo Berrios, alleged selective and discriminatory prose-
cution. Berrios had been indicted for violating a federal statute 278
which provided that "no person who has been convicted of the crime
of arson, among others, shall within 5 years of such conviction serve
as an officer or employee of a labor organization." 279 Berrios became
a Trustee and member of the Executive Board of Teamsters Union
Local 840 within five years of an arson conviction. The other de-
fendants had been charged with violating the same statute by willfully
and knowingly permitting Berrios to hold union office after his
conviction. 28
0
Berrios contended that he had been singled out for prosecution
because of his opposition to former President Nixon and because of
ment of Justice). Finally, in some cases, the prosecutor makes unsolicited state-
ments, e.g., United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d at 622, or statements while in con-
ference with the court, e.g., Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 967 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
276. United States v. Kahl, 583 F.2d 1351, 1354 (5th Cir. 1978) (Internal
Revenue Service intelligence reports on tax protestor activity sought by defendant
deemed irrelevant and privileged) ; United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304, 1309
(5th Cir. 1978) (discovery of internal IRS documents denied because defendant
failed to make necessary prima facie case) ; United States v. Kelly, 556 F.2d 257,
264 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir.
1974) (defendant could not subpoena prosecutors to testify about their exercise of
prosecutorial discretion without first establishing prima facie case of discriminatory
prosecution) ; United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 54 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 925 (1976) (defendant denied discovery because he failed to establish
prima facie case of discriminatory prosecution) ; United States v. Baechler, 509
F.2d 13, 15 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 993 (1975) (court disallowed
defendant's request for selective service records indicating how many men registered
in United States and in defendant's state and for all records of selective service
dealing with nonregistration or potential registrants because it had not been shown
that evidence requested would be necessary for adequate defense) ; United States
v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 188-92 (3d Cir. 1973) (defendants could not discover
government files relating to decision to investigate and seek indictments in the
defendant's case and in all cases of prosecutions brought under statute in question
because defendants failed to make adequate prima facie showing) ; Dear Wing Jung
v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1962) (defendant's request for informa-
tion concerning organizations listed in files of Immigration and Naturalization Serv-
ice denied because INS is "merely" an investigatory and not a prosecutorial agency).
But see United States v. Leggett & Platt, 542 F.2d 655, 658 (6th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977) (to override governmental interest in secrecy, balancing
test should be applied and need for documents must outweigh interest in secrecy).
277. 501 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1974).
278. 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1976).
279. 501 F.2d at 1209.
280. Id.
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his efforts to unionize an enterprise that was closely connected with
Nixon's family.28' At an oral argument to determine whether a hear-
ing on the charge of selective prosecution would be necessary, the
judge instead ordered the government to turn over to the court a
memorandum that had been sent by the prosecutor to the United States
Department of Justice recommending that prosecution of the defendants
be initiated.28 2 The judge ruled that after an in camera inspection
and removal of any confidential information, he would make the memo-
randum available to defense counsel. When the government refused
to comply with the court's order for evidentiary production,83 the
judge then held that Berrios' allegations warranted a hearing on the
selective prosecution issue and that Berrios' "offer of proof" was suf-
ficient to create a prima facie case of selective prosecution. 28 4  The
judge consequently dismissed the indictment upon Berrios' motion.2"'
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated
the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings. 2s6 The court held that the trial judge had gone "too far in
directing the government to surrender the memorandum 'for release
to the defendants of any portions thereof which the court shall deter-
mine are not required to be kept confidential.' "287 However, the
court held that the government would still have to disclose the memo-
randum to the judge for inspection. The judge was to disclose to
defense counsel only material contained therein which would be rele-
vant, or tend to establish, the elements of Berrios' defense of selective
and discriminatory prosecution. 28  The court was somewhat skeptical
of the district judge's action,28 9 and it clarified what it believed was
necessary to entitle a defendant to subpoena documentary evidence to
281. Id. at 1209-10. Specifically, Berrios contended that he had been singled
out for prosecution because he was one of the few teamsters officials who had out-
spokenly supported Senator McGovern rather than former President Nixon in
1972. Id. at 1209. Additionally, he had been spearheading an effort to unionize
the Marriott Restaurant chain, an enterprise that apparently was closely connected
with the Nixon family. Id. For a further discussion of Berrios' claim, see note
211 supra.
282. 501 F.2d at 1208-09.
283. The government explained that the prosecutor had learned of Berrios'
criminal record while investigating a charge of arson lodged against him for an
attempted firebomb attack on a Marriott restaurant. Berrios was acquitted of this
charge after a jury trial. 501 F.2d at 1210.
284. Id. at 1210-11.
285. Id. at 1211.
286. Id. at 1213.
287. Id. at 1212 (quoting from opinion and order of Judge Judd, filed Jan. 7,
1974).
288. 501 F.2d at 1212-13.
289. The Court said: "Upon the meager preliminary showing made here, we
doubt whether we would have granted a hearing or ordered the production of evi-
dence for such a hearing, since Berrios appears frankly to have embarked upon a
fishing expedition." Id. at 1211.
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establish a selective prosecution defense, stating that "we would first
require some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential
elements of the defense and that the documents in the government's
possession would indeed be probative of these elements." 290 Com-
menting on the weakness of Berrios' claim, to the extent that Berrios
had neither pointed to the existence of other unprosecuted violations
of the same statute nor represented that the government's files would
support his beliefs, the court nevertheless recognized "that the decision
to permit a hearing and, in anticipation thereof, to authorize a sub-
poena of evidence in the government's possession, lies largely in the
trial judge's discretion." 291
A case that proceeded in a similar vein was United States v.
Cammisano.92 In Cammisano, the defendants had challenged indict-
ments charging them with violations of the Meat Inspection Act, 293
claiming they had been singled out for prosecution because of their
Italian ancestry."' The district court dismissed the indictments 295
after the prosecutor's refusal to comply with an order requiring the
government to disclose for in camera inspection six broad categories
of government documents which the defendants had requested, con-
tending that they would support their claims of selective prosecution.2 6
The government, appealing the dismissal of the indictment, noted
that it had complied with part of the production order,29 7 and argued
that the defendants' allegations were insufficient to warrant production
290. Id. at 1211-12.
291. Id. at 1212.
292. 546 F.2d 238 (8th Cir. 1976).
293. Defendants were indicted under 21 U.S.C. §§ 610, 676 (1976). 546 F.2d at
239.
294. Id. Another defendant, Miles, claimed he was being selectively prosecuted
because of his association with Italians. Id. The lower court had noted that there
was a question as to whether the defendants were instead being prosecuted for their
alleged mob connections. United States v. Cammisano, 413 F. Supp. 886, 891 n.5
(W.D. Mo. 1976).
295. 413 F. Sup. at 888.
296. 546 F.2d at 239.
297. Id. at 240. The government had produced the following requested
documents:
All general directives of the Department of Agriculture to its employees,
especially but not limited to inspectors, concerning procedures for reporting
of possible violations of Section 601ff, Title 21, U.S.C. [sic], to the Depart-
ment of Agriculture and to the Department of Justice.
All general directives of the Department of Justice to its employees
concerning procedures for handling of reports relating to violation of Section
601iff, Title 21 U.S.C. [sic].
Any list compiled, maintained and/or published by the Department of
Justice or any agency under its supervision which lists so-called organized
crime figures in the Western District of Missouri.
546 F.2d at 239-40 nn.1, 2 & 6.
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of the other requested documents,298 because the defendants had failed
to make a "colorable claim" of selective prosecution. The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit cited the Berrios "colorable basis"
standard: "[W]e would first require some evidence tending to show
the existence of the essential elements of the defense and that the docu-
ments in the government's possession would indeed be probative of
these elements.-" -9 The court rejected the government's contentions
that the defendants failed to show a "colorable basis" for their selective
prosecution claim, and that the documents already produced refuted
the defendants' claims. The court referred to the district judge's ob-
servation that the evidence adduced at that point was inconclusive;
there was some evidence that tended to support the defendants' claims
that they had been singled out for prosecution because of their Italian
ancestry. 00 The court appeared to be swayed by the unrefuted evi-
dence that a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent had told one of the
defendants that he was going to put the defendant in jail unless the
defendant went to work for him."0 1
The court concluded that the trial judge, in ordering further in
camera inspection of the government documents, had not exceeded his
broad discretionary powers. 3"2  However, the court did hold that the
production order, as it stood, was overbroad in at least one respect.
The part of the order requiring information as to all violations of the
298. Id. at 240. The government had not produced the following:
All correspondence, inter-department communications, intra-department
communications and referral documents relating to the particular violations
alleged in this prosecution which were made, retained and/or transmitted
within the Department of Agriculture, within the Department of of [sic]
Justice and between them, together with all reports attached to such docu-
ments, correspondence and communications except as have already been
provided defendants with notations as to which items have been so provided.
All correspondence, inter-department communications, intra-department
communications and referral documents together with all supporting docu-
ments and reports, relating to any violations of Sections [sic] 601ff, Title
21 U.S.C. which occurred in the Western District of Missouri during the
period January, 1972, to and through December, 1974, and which were made,
retained and/or transmitted within the Department of Justice and between
them, whether such correspondence, communications and documents resulted
in prosecution or not.
All correspondence, inter-department communications, intra-department
communications and referral documents, together with all supporting docu-
ments and reports relating to any violations of Sections [sic] 601ff, Title
21 U.S.C., which occurred in the United States for the period January, 1972
to and through December, 1974, and which were made, retained and/or
transmitted within the Department of Agriculture, within the Department
of Justice and between them, whether such correspondence, communications
and documents resulted in prosecution or not.
546 F.2d at 239-40 nn.3, 4 & 5.
299. Id. at 241 (citing United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d at 1211-12 (emphasis
in original)).
300. 546 F.2d at 239. See also 413 F. Supp. 886, 890.
301. 546 F2d at 242.
302. Id.
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statute nationwide between 1972 and 1974 was deemed unlikely to
shed any light upon the alleged "Italian" prosecutions in the area of
Kansas City, Missouri.30 3 The court vacated the dismissal in order to
give the prosecutor the opportunity to submit to the district court the
remainder of the materials specified in the discovery order. Interest-
ingly, the government subsequently moved to dismiss the indictment
rather than to permit defense counsel to examine the data which the
government had produced for the court's in camera examinationY' 4
The government's motion to dismiss was granted. 30 5
The Berrios and Cammisano opinions are noteworthy because
they reflect judicial insight into the proof problems facing defendants
who believe their prosecutions have been discriminatory. Instead of
merely reciting the broad discretion and autonomy afforded the prose-
cutor, these courts sought to balance the interests of both defendants
and prosecutors. By ordering in camera inspection of government
documents, the court can protect the prosecutor's interest in confi-
dentiality. At the same time, by disclosing to defense counsel non-
confidential information relevant to the issue of selective or discrimi-
natory prosecution, defendants have an opportunity to obtain the
evidence they will need to prove discrimination. Defendants are not
then put in the untenable position of having the burden of proof with-
out access to the necessary evidence.30 6 Berrios and Cammisano are
surely a step in the right direction.
However, it should be noted that a rule of in camera inspection
and subsequent disclosure to defense counsel of relevant nonconfidential
prosecutorial information will be of value to the defendant only if such
information is actually maintained by the prosecutor. In this context,
the need for prosecutorial guidelines becomes clear. Although there
is strong support for the maintenance of prosecutorial policy guidelines
and procedures,10 7 it does not appear that such information is routinely
kept by prosecutors' offices. Promulgating and following guidelines
and procedures not only aids a defendant who claims that his or her
prosecution is discriminatory, but is also useful to the prosecutor in
303. Id.
304. 433 F. Supp. 964, 965 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
305. Id. at 967.
306. Krieger, Defense Access to Evidence of Discriminatory Prosecution, 1974
U. Iu. L.F. 648, 661 (1974) (forceful argument asserted for disclosure of govern-
ment information to defense counsel, or at least to judge for in camera inspection
to alleviate defendant's impossible burden).
307. A.B.A. Project, supra note 21 §2.5; Principles, supra note 20, at 2;
Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1, 10-25 (1975) ; Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Crimi-
nal Justice Officials, 1976 DuKE L.J. 651, 681-82; Vorenberg, supra note 222, at
1523.
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the "reasoned exercise" of his or her discretion 30" and in achieving
"fair, efficient and effective enforcement of the criminal law." " A
requirement 810 that prosecutors' offices maintain guidelines and state-
ments of procedure would be both useful and reasonable. Such guide-
lines or statements of prosecutorial procedure should normally be made
accessible to defense counsel, as well as to the public."'
In addition, and especially relevant with respect to the issue of
discriminatory prosecutions, it is not unreasonable to require prose-
cutors to make and keep in their files information about why particular
prosecutions are brought. 12 At first glance, such a requirement might
seem overburdensome. However, this suggestion is not intended to
force prosecutors to justify every prosecution. It is simply a record-
keeping requirement of a prosecutorial process that does, or should,
go on.
Typically, a prosecutor will consider a number of factors in de-
ciding whether or not to bring a particular case. 13 These considera-
tions should be reflected in the office's charging guidelines or formal-
ized policy statement. The prosecutor could then indicate which
308. Principles, supra note 20, at 1.
309. A.B.A. Project, supra note 21, § 2.5.
310. This requirement could be implemented through legislative action or by
rule or order of the United States Attorney General. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.5 (1980).
311. For a particularly persuasive argument that prosecutorial policy should
be published and hence accessible to defense counsel see Abrams, supra note 307,
at 25-34. Abrams argues that there should be a free flow of government informa-
tion, particularly with respect to prosecutorial policy. Such policy has political
implications and involves basic societal concerns. Therefore, prosecutorial policy
should be subject to scrutiny, evaluation and criticism. Id. at 26-27. Abrams
discusses and rebuts arguments made against the publication of prosecutorial policy.
Id. at 28-34. Especially noteworthy is his discussion of the argument that publica-
tion of policy will improperly modify the deterrent effect of the criminal law. Abrams
says :
The principle that emerges may be set forth as follows: Where the
reasons for adopting the policy are grounded in substantive concerns relat-
ing to the appropriateness of full, partial, or no enforcement of the law in
question, the policy should be published. Where, however, the reasons for
the policy involve matters of convenience such as allocation of resources,
or other administrative considerations, the policy need not be published. The
premise is that while some policies amount to a substantive modification of
the criminal law that the public has a right to know about, the prosecutor
should not detract from the deterrent effect of a criminal statute merely
for the purposes of administrative convenience.
Id. at 30 (emphasis in original).
312. In Principles, supra note 20, at 14, it is stated that, "whenever the attorney
for the government declines to commence or recommend federal prosecution, he
should ensure that his decision and reasons therefor are communicated to the in-
vestigating agency involved and to any other interested agency, and are reflected in
the files of his office." (emphasis added). If prosecutors should keep information
about why particular prosecutions are not brought, it is not unreasonable to require
information about why particular prosecutions are brought. See Vorenberg, supra
note 222, at 1552-53, for a persuasive argument for such prosecutorial record-keeping
as a means of ensuring prosecutorial accountability.
313. For a discussion of the factors a prosecutor considers, see the discussion
in Part I supra.
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particular factors or considerations were present in a particular prose-
tion. These records should normally, and quite easily, be kept in the
prosecutor's file. 14
In most cases, a prosecutor's decision to bring charges should go
unchallenged. However, in those cases where the defendant claims
and makes some initial showing that his or her prosecution is discrimi-
natory, the prosecutor, upon the court's order, could turn over his or
her files to the court with subsequent disclosure of relevant, noncon-
fidential information to defense counsel." 5  In most cases it is hoped
that the prosecutor's decision to charge would fall clearly within the
parameters of the guidelines. In cases where the prosecutor's decision
to charge appears extraordinary or aberrant with respect to the charg-
ing guidelines, the defendant will have some concrete evidence to put
forward to support his or her charge of discriminatory prosecution."'6
V. CONCLUSION
Although the prosecutor exercises a great deal of discretion in the
decision to charge, that discretion may not be exercised in a discrimi-
natory manner violative of the equal protection guarantee embodied in
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Discriminatory enforcement oc-
curs when the prosecutor singles out for prosecution an individual or
individuals on the basis of an arbitrary classification such as race,
religion, or nationality, or to prevent the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights. A discriminatory prosecution is invalid and may be
314. It is advocated here that prosecutor's offices should both issue guidelines
or policy statements and keep records of the circumstances behind charging deci-
sions. This author believes that prosecutors do follow unwritten guidelines; if
they are not following such guidelines, they should be. Although it would cer-
tainly require some effort to promulgate formal guidelines, this author would argue
that prosecutor's offices can and should take that action. Another commentator has
argued that prosecutors first be required to keep records of their decisions to charge,
and, eventually, from a compilation of those records, issue guidelines. See Voren-
berg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE L.J. 651,
694-97. Although this compilation process might result in a more reasoned de-
liberation than the immediate issuance of guidelines, it presents the problem of
additional delay in the formulating of guidelines. Prosecutorial decisions in the
interim would still run the very real risk of being ad hoc or arbitrary. In either case
-whether the guidelines follow or precede the record-keeping requirement-prose-
cutors should regularly be keeping these guidelines and records.
315. This in camera disclosure would be of the type envisioned in Berrios and
Caminisano, discussed supra at notes 277-306 and accompanying text.
316. It is not within the scope of this paper to suggest how much weight should
be accorded to evidence of noncompliance with prosecutorial guidelines. It seems
clear that a prosecution should not be struck down simply because a prosecutor did
not follow his or her office's guidelines; however, an unexplained failure to follow
the guidelines might suffice to render the prosecution invalid. Perhaps the burden of
proving nondiscrimination should shift to the prosecutor upon a showing that the
prosecution was not brought according to the usual procedure, or by following the
guidelines. However, it should be noted that the method of shifting the burden
proposed in Falk, 479 F.2d 616, 623-24 (7th Cir. 1973) (en banc), was not fol-
lowed in subsequent cases. Thus, the efficacy of this suggestion will hinge upon
the court's willingness to actually shift the burden.
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struck down by the court, generally pursuant to a pre-trial motion by
the defendant and an evidentiary hearing.
In recent years there have been many claims of discriminatory
federal prosecutions. Surprisingly, almost all of the challenges con-
cerned defendants who claimed their prosecutions were brought to stifle
their exercise of constitutionally protected rights. It is not surprising
that most of these challenges have failed, as they were often brought
by vocal tax protestors prosecuted for failure to file returns or pay
taxes. The government routinely showed that all known tax violators
are prosecuted, and protestors are, by their nature, simply more visible.
It is not easy to be as sanguine about the outcome of other claims
of discriminatory prosecution. The difficulties facing the defendant,
who may very well have a valid claim, in meeting his or her burden of
proof are nearly insurmountable. There is a presumption of prose-
cutorial good faith, and the defendant must put forward a rather
substantial prima facie showing simply to obtain a hearing on the issue.
Although it is justifiable to put some initial burden on the defendant,
it is not justifiable, as courts have done, to make the defendant's burden
overwhelming-especially since the information which could prove or
disprove the defendant's claims is usually in the prosecutor's hands and
is often not discoverable. The author does not advocate the complete
opening up of prosecutorial files. Nevertheless, it does appear neces-
sary to change the present system.
A reworking of the concept of the prima facie case is needed, since
at present, the defendant's prima facie showing is virtually impossible
to make. However, at the outset, this author would suggest a doc-
trinal clarification. A claim of discriminatory prosecution is based
upon the equal protection clause. Therefore, it would make a great
deal of sense to unify the standards necessary to allege selective en-
forcement with those required to make out an equal protection viola-
tion. This is hardly a novel idea in theory, although it may well be
unique in practice. An examination of what is required to show dis-
criminatory enforcement, in fact, reveals an equal protection analysis.
Discrimination among those "similarly situated" is a fundamental
tenet of equal protection jurisprudence.11 The same is true of the
requirement that the discrimination be based upon some impermissible
classification, such as race, religion or national origin. However, the
problem arises in application. Courts have taken a very narrow read-
ing of what constitutes an "unjustifiable . . . or . . . arbitrary classifi-
cation" 318 for purposes of discriminatory enforcement. Discrimination
317. See generally Tussman and ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
318. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
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on the basis of race, national origin, and in some cases, the exercise of
first amendment rights appears to be the only ground for allowing the
defendant to attack prosecutorial abuse. Since the scope of the equal
protection clause is far broader, the scope of impermissible prosecu-
torial discrimination should be expanded to the parameters of that
constitutional provision.3 19 In addition to doctrinal consistency, the
proposed unification would also provide judges, faced with a novel
claim of selective enforcement, with a ready body of precedent to con-
sult-equal protection cases. Most importantly, this will make the de-
fendant's burden of establishing a prima facie case easier. The require-
ment that others similarly situated were not prosecuted is a necessary
one under the equal protection clause. However, there is nothing to
prevent the court from accepting, for example, evidence of general
nonenforcement of a statute s20 as satisfaction of this prong of defend-
ant's prima facie showing. This would be entirely consistent with the
reality that the prosecutor is the party with access to this kind of
information. The defendant would then have to allege and make some
initial showing that he was intentionally discriminated against on the
basis of any classification that would be deemed impermissible under
the equal protection clause.
The next step in the process is crucial. Since the defendant has
made a prima facie showing as outlined above, the burden must actually
shift to the prosecution to prove non-discrimination. Although the
court in Falk indicated that the burden would shift to the prosecution,
subsequent cases reveal the courts' reluctance to actually shift the
burden.
This scheme will strike a balance between the interests of both the
defendant and the prosecutor. The defendant's prima facie showing
will no longer be impossible to make-it will be enough to allege that
which would suffice for any ordinary equal protection violation. At
the same time, the defendant's threshold showing will not be so low as
to subject both the prosecutor and the courts to a deluge of unfounded
claims. To be sure, this model places more of a burden on the prose-
cutor to justify his or her selection. However, the defendant will still
be required to make a fairly strong prima facie showing. And, as dis-
cussed throughout this article, the prosecutor is in an infinitely better
position to meet this burden than is the defendant.
319. For example, discrimination on the basis of sex in the prosecution of cer-
tain crimes might serve as a basis for attacking a prosecution. In the case of a
prosecution under a regulatory statute, the defendant ought to be able to assert
that his or her prosecution bears no rational relation to the purpose of the statute.
320. A generally unenforced law could be shown by evidence of a policy of
nonenforcement or numerical data demonstrating few prosecutions in a given number
of years.
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Another suggestion, and one that has been followed in Berrios
and Cammisano, is the disclosure of prosecutorial files to the court for
in camera inspection following the defendant's initial showing of dis-
crimination. The defendant's initial burden could be based upon the
prima facie showing suggested above. The court would then make
available to defense counsel relevant, nonconfidential information con-
cerning the claims. Of course, crucial to this procedure is the required
regular maintenance of prosecutorial guidelines in the charging de-
cision and information or records indicating why the particular case
was brought. This procedure has the advantage of permitting the
development of serious claims of prosecutorial discrimination while at
the same time safeguarding the prosecutor's interest in confidentiality.
Although many defendants may allege that their prosecutions are dis-
criminatory, "frivolous" claims can easily be weeded out and valid
claims will have an opportunity to be heard. The criminal justice
system would benefit from making the prosecutor, who is vested with
the power of enforcing violations of the laws, more accountable for the
lawfulness of his or her actions.
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